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作者：Drymiotes, George; Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru
作者单位：Texas Christian University; Rice University
摘要：Recent corporate governance scandals have been attributed to a lack of board independence because of the influence CEOs have over their boards. However, CEOs can also affect board efficacy without compromising its independence by strategically choosing directors. We offer a theoretical framework to examine how CEOs can strategically choose director characteristics (such as expertise and skill set) to influence the inner workings of the board. We examine how director expertise affects the board...
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作者：Dekeyser, Simon; Gaeremynck, Ann; Knechel, W. Robert; Willekens, Marleen
作者单位：KU Leuven; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Auckland; University of New South Wales Sydney; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Competition in audit markets is an important topic but direct tests of market competition have been limited. In this paper, we examine how audit firms behave when they are confronted with competition from another firm in a wide range of industry segments in a local market. Sharing a large number of market segments can lead to mutual forbearance among audit rivals. Such mutual forbearance is likely to manifest as higher audit fees in a market because rivals are hesitant to aggressively compete ...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Hashimoto, Tadashi
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Yeshiva University
摘要：This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication between the CEO and the board. The results are in contrast to the multitude of models which generally find that management-friendly boards improve communication, and help to explain empirical results concer...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Most firms covary more positively with downmarkets than upmarkets-a phenomenon I refer to as risk asymmetry. I predict and find that risk asymmetry is caused, at least in part, by a firm's ability to selectively obfuscate poor performance. Risk asymmetry decreases significantly when firms are required to adhere to the more stringent auditing standards mandated under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however this decrease is more muted for firms with weak internal controls. Consistent with...
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作者：Friedman, Henry L.; Mahieux, Lucas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tilburg University
摘要：How can features of the markets for audit and nonaudit services (NAS) affect an audit firm's incentives to invest in audit quality, average audit quality, and social welfare? We address these questions in a model focusing on competition in both audit and NAS markets. We show that, when audit and NAS demand are positively correlated, prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to audit clients leads to higher investments in audit quality, but can decrease average audit quality if marginal clients s...
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作者：Gow, Ian D.; Larcker, David F.; Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a non-answer. Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from managers, a rate that is stable over time and similar across industries. A useful feature of our measure is that it enables an examination of disclosure choice within a call. Analyst questions with a negative tone...
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作者：Cardinaels, Eddy; Feichter, Christoph
作者单位：Tilburg University; KU Leuven; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Many firms use forced rating systems in which supervisors must evaluate employees according to a predefined distribution. We develop new theory suggesting that forced ratings are less likely to enhance performance when supervisors assess subjective dimensions of employee performance (e.g., creativity), but can have some harmful side effects. In a laboratory experiment, employees work on a creative task, and supervisors rate their performance. We do not find any difference in the employees' per...
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作者：Choi, Jung Ho
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper evaluates the role of accrual accounting in improving firms' production decisions and resource allocation across firms. I introduce two imperfect firm-performance measures, cash flows and accounting earnings, into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms under imperfect information. The model demonstrates that improvements in measurement systems lead to more informed decisions on the part of firms and ultimately to allocation of greater resources to high-productivity fir...
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作者：Brendel, Janja; Ryans, James
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of London; London Business School
摘要：This study provides descriptive evidence on how firms respond to activist short seller reports and how these responses are associated with outcomes for the targeted firms. We show that the frequency of these reports has grown substantially in recent years. Although we find that firms respond only 31% of the time, this rate increases substantially when the report is accompanied by significantly negative abnormal returns and when the report contains new evidence. Not responding is associated wit...
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作者：Cao, Sean Shun; Du, Kai; Yang, Baozhong; Zhang, Alan L.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We examine whether firms that imitate peer companies' strategies (copycats) profit from such behavior and how their success may cause competitive harm to disclosing companies. We identify copycat companies by tracking the digital footprints of investment companies that view disclosures on the SEC EDGAR Web site. We find that copycat companies are able to identify profitable trades that outperform other trades disclosed by the copycatted companies by 5.5% annually. Such stock-screening skills a...
