Non-Answers During Conference Calls

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gow, Ian D.; Larcker, David F.; Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12371
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1349-1384
• 关键词: product market competition; import competition; discretionary disclosure; PROPRIETARY COSTS; earnings; INFORMATION; analysts; managerial; adjustment; POLICY

摘要

We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a non-answer. Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from managers, a rate that is stable over time and similar across industries. A useful feature of our measure is that it enables an examination of disclosure choice within a call. Analyst questions with a negative tone, greater uncertainty, greater complexity, or requests for greater detail are more likely to trigger non-answers. We find performance-related questions tend to be associated with non-answers, and this association is weaker when performance news is favorable. We also find analyst questions about proprietary information are associated with non-answers, and this association is stronger when firm competition is more intense.