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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Heinle, Mirko S.; Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs their. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse...
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作者：Chen, Hui; Liang, Pierre Jinghong; Petrov, Evgeny
作者单位：University of Zurich; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two-period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision-useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of...
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作者：Breuer, Matthias; Labro, Eva; Sapra, Haresh; Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of North Carolina; University of Chicago
摘要：Formal theory and empirical research are complementary in building and advancing the body of knowledge in accounting in order to understand real-world phenomena. We offer thoughts on opportunities for empiricists and theorists to collaborate, build on each other's work, and iterate over models and data to make progress. For empiricists, we see room for more descriptive work, more experimental work on testing formal theories, and more work on quantifying theoretical parameters. For theorists, w...
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作者：Cheynel, Edwige; Cianciaruso, Davide; Zhou, Frank S.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); New Economic School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to ...
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作者：Kim, Jung Min
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I examine how investors' search for different types of information affects managers' reporting decisions. I distinguish investors' search for information about firm fundamentals (fundamental search) from their search for information about managers' incentives (incentive search). Based on a parsimonious model of misreporting, I predict that fundamental search reduces the earnings response coefficient, which reduces managers' benefits from misreporting, resulting in less misreporting. In contras...
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作者：Jiang, Xu; Laux, Volker
作者单位：Duke University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information...
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作者：Raghunandan, Aneesh; Ruchti, Thomas g.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms' compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, viol...
