作者：BIZJAK, JM; BRICKLEY, JA; COLES, JL
作者单位：University of Rochester; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：This paper examines how excessive concern over current stock price can motivate managers to use observable investment decisions to manipulate the market's inferences about the firm. The result can be overinvestment or underinvestment. Shareholders can induce optimal investment choices by structuring managerial compensation to balance both future and present stock-price performance. Our analysis suggests that firms with high/persistent informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders...
作者：SHIVDASANI, A
摘要：This paper examines whether differences in the structure of the board of directors and equity ownership contribute to the incidence of hostile takeovers. Evidence from a sample of completed and abandoned hostile takeover attempts that occurred during 1980-1988 indicates that, relative to a control sample, outside directors in hostile targets have lower ownership stakes and hold fewer additional outside directorships. Ownership by blockholders unaffiliated with management raises and that by aff...
