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作者：Craswell, A; Stokes, DJ; Laughton, J
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Queensland; University of Southern Queensland
摘要：This study investigates whether fee dependence within the audit firms' offices jeopardises auditor independence. Fee dependence is examined at both the national audit firm level as well as the local office level and in a setting where public disclosure of fees is mandatory. We focus our tests on audit fee dependence and at the same time we control for the effects of non-audit service fee dependence post the 1989 mergers. We operationalise the exercise of independent judgement in auditing by th...
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作者：Bartov, E; Givoly, D; Hayn, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; New York University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts' earnings expectations (MBE) enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations. Further, such a premium to MBE, although somewhat smaller, exists in the cases where MBE is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management. The findings also indicate that the premium to MBE is a leading indicator of future performance. This pr...
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作者：Rajgopal, S; Shevlin, T
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine whether executive stock options (ESOs) provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects. For a sample of oil and gas producers, we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity (our proxy for exploration risk) increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEO's options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). Both ESO risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultan...
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作者：Beatty, A; Ramesh, K; Weber, J
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In this paper, we examine how the exclusion of voluntary and mandatory accounting changes from the calculation of covenant compliance affects the interest rate charged on the loan. After controlling for self-selection bias and other factors known to affect loan spreads, we find that the rate charged is 84 basis points lower when voluntary accounting changes are excluded and 71 basis points lower when mandatory accounting changes are excluded. Our results suggest that borrowers are willing to p...
