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作者:Roychowdhury, Sugata
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:I find evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that these activities are less prevalent in the presence of sophisticated investors. Other factors that influence real activities manipulation includ...
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作者:Core, John E.; Guay, Wayne R.; Verdi, Rodrigo S.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments...
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作者:Petrovits, Christine M.
作者单位:New York University
摘要:This study examines the strategic use of corporate philanthropy programs to achieve financial reporting objectives. Corporate-sponsored foundations allow managers to maintain stable levels of giving to charitable causes while providing substantial discretion as to the amount of contribution expense recorded on the income statement in any given period. I find that firms reporting small earnings increases make income-increasing discretionary foundation funding choices. This result is associated ...
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作者:Beaver, William H.; Shakespeare, Catherine; Soliman, Mark T.
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University
摘要:We examine whether the properties of bond ratings from certified agencies (designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) differ from those of non-certified bond-rating agencies. Bond ratings from non-certified agencies are used solely for investment advice. Certified ratings are used by a variety of constituents, many of whom write contracts incorporating these ratings. We find that the properties of the ratings from the two agency types differ in predictable ways. Our results sh...
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作者:Comprix, Joseph; Muller, Karl A., III
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要:We provide evidence that CEO cash compensation is relatively less sensitive to pension expense than pension income, suggesting that compensation committees shield CEO cash compensation from pension expense amounts. We also provide evidence that managers use relatively higher expected rate of return estimates when reporting pension income, suggesting that managers select income-increasing accounting estimates in response to compensation committees' greater emphasis on pension income in CEO cash...
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作者:Guenther, David A.; Sansing, Richard
作者单位:Dartmouth College; University of Oregon; Tilburg University
摘要:We investigate how shareholder-level taxes are capitalized into stock prices using a model that incorporates the investment and payout decisions of a firm and the investment alternatives available to investors. Shareholder taxes affect stock prices both indirectly, via the effect of taxes on corporate investment decisions, and directly, by reducing both the mean and variance of after-tax returns. In our model, tax capitalization is not eliminated by the presence of tax-exempt investors, does n...
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作者:Bolton, Patrick; Mehran, Hamid
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University
摘要:This paper provides a brief overview of the current state of the not-for-profit sector and discusses specific governance issues in not-for-profit organizations. We offer an in-depth analysis of the issues that arise when not-for-profit organizations compete against for-profit firms in the same markets. We argue that while competition by for-profit firms can discipline not-for-profit firms and mitigate their governance problems, the effects of this competition are distorted by the not-for-profi...
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作者:Lennox, Clive S.; Park, Chul W.
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要:Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm's value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm's earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior ...