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作者：Ellahie, Atif; Tahoun, Ahmed; Tuna, Irem
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We use the ethnicity of CEOs across 31 countries as a proxy for their common inherited beliefs and values and find an ethnicity effect in CEO variable pay. We find that the ethnicity effect in variable pay is not driven by the ethnicity effects in corporate policy decisions, and that changes in CEO compensation are significantly larger when CEOs are replaced with a person from a different ethnicity. Our estimated ethnicity effect captures the future time reference and religion of CEOs' ancesto...
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作者：Kumar, Praveen; Langberg, Nisan; Oded, Jacob; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; Tel Aviv University; Rice University
摘要：We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor repurchase, firms with intermediate values disclose but do not repurchase, and firms in the highest value region induce undervaluation by not disclosing and buy back shares. In particular, the well known unravel...
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作者：Carrizosa, Richard; Ryan, Stephen G.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas El Paso; New York University
摘要：We identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accountingzrelated private information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements. We hypothesize and provide evidence that: (1) loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders' loan contract monitoring; (2) the covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract am...
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作者：Dou, Ying
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：When firms experience negative events such as lawsuits or earnings restatements, their directors also suffer. But what about those who leave shortly before the events? I show that directors who leave prior to negative events experience greater declines in the number of their directorships than directors who stay through the events, but smaller declines than directors who leave after the events. These declines do not appear to be voluntary or driven by forced departures. Instead, they appear to...
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作者：Glaeser, Stephen; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the dissemination of mine safety information in SEC filings has real effects on mine safety. We discuss the extent to which Christensen et al.'s results generalize to a research question that we consider of broader interest to accounting researchers, specifically where and when mandated disclosure in SEC filings can increase the dissemination of information. We also discuss identification of causal effects and generalizability concerns more broad...
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作者：Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart; Laux, Volker
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper examines the role of the financial reporting environment in selecting a new CEO from within versus outside the organization. Weak reporting controls allow the CEO to misreport performance information, which reduces the board's ability to detect and replace poorly-performing CEOs as well as aggravates incentive contracting. We show that these adverse effects are stronger when the CEO is an outsider rather than an insider. Our model predicts that boards are more likely to recruit a CE...
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作者：Akins, Brian; Dou, Yiwei; Ng, Jeffrey
作者单位：Rice University; New York University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less asso...
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作者：Shroff, Nemit; Verdi, Rodrigo S.; Yost, Benjamin P.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston College
摘要：This paper examines whether and when the information environment of peer firms in an industry affects the cost of capital for other firms in the industry. We predict and find that the peer information environment is negatively associated with a firm's cost of capital when there is less publicly available firm-specific information and this negative association shrinks as the amount of firm-specific information increases. This paper provides evidence that information about peer-firms has externa...
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作者：Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper discusses evidence that large, diversified banks lend using 'hard' information measures, such as audited financial statements. Structural changes toward larger and more diversified banks may have left some segments of credit markets - those depending on investment in 'soft' information - under-served. These trends accelerated following the Financial Crisis. At the same time, bank lending to small businesses, which typically can only supply soft information, has been slow to recover ...
