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作者：Gipper, Brandon
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of expanded compensation disclosures on manager pay. For identification, I use the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in the 2007 proxy season, a significant expansion in required compensation disclosures, to compare manager pay at firms with and without the disclosure in a difference -indifferences analysis. These disclosures are associated with increasing pay, contrary to the conventional wisdom that pay disclosures reduce pay leve...
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作者：Samuels, Delphine; Taylor, Daniel J.; Verrecchia, Robert E.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper examines how the ex ante level of public scrutiny influences a manager's subsequent decision to misreport. The conventional wisdom is that high levels of public scrutiny facilitate monitoring, suggesting a negative relation between scrutiny and misreporting. However, public scrutiny also increases the weight that investors place on earnings in valuing the firm. This in turn increases the benefit of misreporting, suggesting a positive relation. We formalize these two countervailing f...
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作者：Mao, Yifei
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Using exogenous variations in the market value of corporate real estate, this paper investigates whether appreciation of corporate collateral value facilitates innovation. My baseline finding shows that real estate appreciation leads to an increase in innovation quantity as measured by patent productions and in innovation quality as measured by citations per patent, especially when firms are credit constrained. To uncover the underlying channel, I show that real estate appreciation allows addi...
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作者：Nagar, Venky; Schoenfeld, Jordan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Dartmouth College
摘要：Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this prediction in the setting where large shareholders contractually bind management to share private information. We find that after the execution of such contracts, firms improve their performance and reduce the...
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作者：Kang, Jung Koo; Loumioti, Maria; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Southern California
摘要：We explore whether the introduction of transparent reporting rules increases credit standard harmonization within a bank. We exploit the new loan-level reporting rules imposed on banks that borrow from the European Central Bank using repurchase agreements collateralized by their asset-backed securities. We compare credit terms of similar mortgages issued by a bank across a country's regions and find that harmonization increases following the adoption of the new reporting rules. Learning and re...
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作者：Chen, Han-Chung; Lee, Yen-Jung; Lo, Sheng-Yi; Yu, Yong
作者单位：National Taipei University; National Taiwan University; Feng Chia University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine how the qualitative characteristics of a non-GAAP earnings disclosure reveal the quality of the non-GAAP performance metric itself. We measure the qualitative aspects of the non-GAAP disclosure using an index of 12 hand-coded characteristics and presen-tation choices that provide context to non-GAAP disclosures. We find that more trans-parent qualitative information in non-GAAP disclosures is associated with more transitory non-GAAP exclusions and a lower likelihood that managers wi...
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作者：Lunawat, Radhika; Shields, Timothy W.; Waymire, Gregory
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Emory University
摘要：Scholars have long suspected that people behave differently when their actions will be observed by or revealed to others. We hypothesize that financial reporting that reveals managers' actions will lead managers to take actions that better align with investor interests. We test this hypothesis with an experiment in which we manipulate the availability of a financial report that reveals managerial actions. Our evidence shows that financial reporting leads a manager to choose reinvestment and re...
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作者：Chy, Mahfuz; De Franco, Gus; Su, Barbara
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Tulane University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and f...
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作者：Reiter, Nayana
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Cross-listing shares abroad can reduce barriers to foreign investment, such as frictions to information flows and limited minority shareholder protection, resulting in capital market benefits for firms. While a large body of literature has sought to explain the consequences of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of communication between managers and investors during this process.1 In this paper, I investigate whether managers change communication policies around a U.S. cr...
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作者：Liu, Zheng; Shen, Hongtao; Welker, Michael; Zhang, Ning; Zhao, Yang
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Jinan University
摘要：We investigate an externality of earnings pressure from capital markets. We define earnings pressure as managers' incentives to meet or beat earnings expectations. Using detailed establishment-level sulfur dioxide emission data from China covering 2003 to 2012, we find that firms with earnings pressure have higher intensity sulfur dioxide emissions. This effect is more pronounced when the strength of monitoring and regulatory enforcement is weak, when litigation risk is low, and when the publi...
