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作者：Menon, Krishnagopal; Williams, David D.
作者单位：Boston University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We investigate chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) changes in firms that experience an auditor resignation. We argue that boards of directors have incentives to replace these managers following an auditor resignation both to improve financial reporting performance and to restore reporting credibility. We use two control samples, one matched on industry and size and the other comprising firms that experienced client-initiated auditor changes. We observe higher turnov...
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作者：Peecher, Mark E.; Piercey, M. David
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Considerable auditing research shows that individuals exhibit outcome effects when judging audit quality. They judge auditor negligence as more likely when given information about adverse audit outcomes. Many studies conclude that outcome information biases individuals against auditors, and/or attempt to improve their judgements by reducing outcome effects. Yet, individuals generally should judge auditors more harshly when given adverse outcomes. A key question is whether individuals' belief r...
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作者：Eldenburg, Leslie G.; Krishnan, Ranjani
作者单位：University of Arizona; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper analyzes the association among ownership, top management incentives, and expenditures on accounting information. We argue that organizations with privately appointed boards of directors such as for-profit and nongovernmental nonprofit organizations use incentive pay practices that encourage managers to use accounting information to improve performance. In contrast, government organizations are publicly governed and are constrained in their compensation practices because hospital CEO...
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作者：Archambeault, Deborah S.; Dezoort, F. Todd; Hermanson, Dana R.
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University
摘要：This study investigates whether incentive-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements. We use an agency framework to predict that short-term (long-term) incentive compensation for audit committee members will increase (decrease) the likelihood of accounting restatements due to error or fraud. Using a matched-sample logistic regression with 153 restatement and 153 nonrestatement companies, we find the predicted positive relation between short-term i...
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作者：Widener, Sally K.; Shackell, Margaret B.; Demers, Elizabeth A.
作者单位：Rice University; Cornell University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：This study investigates how the relatively contemporary phenomenon of social surveillance controls, such as the use of teams and managerial monitoring, affects the design of the firm's more traditional organizational architecture, which is classically defined to consist of three primary components: incentive compensation, the delegation of decision rights, and performance measurement. We find that vertical surveillance (i.e., high-level monitoring) substitutes for delegation while horizontal s...
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作者：Krishnan, Gopal V.; Visvanathan, Gnanakumar
作者单位：Lehigh University; George Mason University
摘要：The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates the disclosure of whether at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert. However, the final version of the rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defined experts to include both accounting and nonaccounting experts. Did the SEC do the right thing? Are the nonaccounting experts just as competent as the accounting experts in enhancing the quality of financial reporting? For a sample of S&P 500 firms, we examine whether the ...
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作者：Lipe, Marlys Gascho
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
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作者：Balakrishnan, Ramji; Gruca, Thomas S.
作者单位：University of Iowa
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作者：Farrell, Anne M.; Kadous, Kathryn; Towry, Kristy L.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Emory University
摘要：We experimentally examine how employees' employment horizons (long or short) and the performance measures in their incentive contracts (forward-looking or contemporaneous) affect employee effort allocation and performance. Consistent with economic theory, we find that the decision-influencing benefits of forward-looking contracts decrease as employees' employment horizons increase toward the firm's profitability horizon. Importantly, we extend this theory to predict decision facilitating benef...
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作者：Maiga, Adam S.; Jacobs, Fred A.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Auburn University System; Auburn University; Auburn University Montgomery
摘要：This study uses structural equation modeling to investigate the association between extent of ABC use and quality, cost, and cycle-time improvements; the relations among quality, cost, and cycle-time improvements; and the association of quality, cost, and cycle-time improvements with profitability at the manufacturing plant level. Overall, the results of the structural analyses support the theoretical model, indicating that (a) extent of ABC use has a significant positive association on cost i...
