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作者：Denison, Christine A.; Farrell, Anne M.; Jackson, Kevin E.
作者单位：Iowa State University; University System of Ohio; Miami University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：While academic and practitioner literature has advocated the use of real options in firms' long-term investment appraisal processes, few studies have examined the extent to which real options are incorporated into decisions when they are available for decision making. Using two experiments, we examine supervising managers' reliance on real options values in judgments about funding subordinates' long-term investment projects. We predict and find with Experiment 1 that, when making funding decis...
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作者：Stocken, Phillip C.
作者单位：Dartmouth College
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作者：Jorgensen, Bjorn N.; Kirschenheiter, Michael T.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：We consider two managers' sequential disclosure strategies. We show how the lead disclosing firm's manager chooses his strategy anticipating the subsequent disclosure choice by a second firm's manager. Prior studies of a single firm offer little insight into how sequential disclosure strategies interact. We show how strategies of both the leader and the follower depend on their signals' correlation. For imperfectly and positively correlated signals, the follower benefits from the leader's disc...
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作者：Drymiotes, George; Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru
作者单位：University of Cyprus; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Recent corporate governance failures have highlighted the need for aligning the incentives of corporate boards with shareholder interests. Equity-based board compensation has been viewed as a way to achieve this objective because it ties board compensation with long-term firm value. However, we show that long-term incentives alone may not suffice in motivating boards to fulfill their role in monitoring corporate executives, although they are effective in inducing boards to play an active advis...
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作者：Lim, Youngdeok; Jung, Kooyul
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：This paper examines the accuracy and optimism of forecasts made by affiliated analysts compared to those made by independent analysts. Using Korean chaebol firms, we test the information-sharing hypothesis and the conflict of interest hypothesis. Our results show that the forecasts made by the affiliated analysts are less accurate and more optimistic than those made by the independent analysts. This finding is inconsistent with the information-sharing hypothesis but supports the conflict of in...
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作者：Aggarwal, Raj; Cao, Jian; Chen, Feng
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Akron; State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University; University of Toronto
摘要：While theory suggests that dividends can be an important credible signal for firm performance, prior studies have been unable to provide strong evidence of dividend signaling among publicly listed U. S. companies. One potential explanation for this inconsistency between theory and empirical evidence is that the cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry across U. S. firms is insufficient to provide adequate test power. In this study, we revisit the link between dividend signaling and f...
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作者：He, Xianjie; Wong, T. J.; Young, Danqing
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study examines an important but underresearched issue - unintended consequences of mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Such unintended consequences are likely to occur in markets in which financial accounting plays a stronger contracting role than the information role and those in which the institutional environment is incompatible with IFRS. Using data from China's adoption of IFRS- based and fair value- oriented new accounting standards in 2007, we ...
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作者：Hecht, Gary; Tafkov, Ivo; Towry, Kristy L.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Emory University
摘要：Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) suggest that use of partial incentive contracts - contracts that provide performance- based pay for only a subset of tasks - can lead to an undesirable shift of employees' attention away from important tasks for which incentives are infeasible. While prior, intuitive research has not supported this assumption, this study provides a theoretical explanation for this misalignment in the literature. Specifically, extant theory and empirical results in neuroscience rese...
