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作者：Jorgensen, Bjorn N.; Kirschenheiter, Michael T.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk-averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that would arise when all traders have constant risk tolerance. We show that these endogenously determined prices are inconsistent with the assumed prices in Verrecchia (1983) when the manager elects to not dis...
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作者：Schneider, Georg T.; Scholze, Andreas
作者单位：University of Graz; University Osnabruck
摘要：We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision-relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results s...
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作者：Wahlen, James M.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：While norms are commonly used in accounting and in accounting research, norms themselves, and their consequences, have not yet received much scholarly examination in accounting. The Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (KMW) study is intriguing because it conducts three experiments to examine whether investors react differently when a firm uses derivatives to mitigate risk when that use conforms with or deviates from expected behavior given past industry-or firm-specific norms. The KMW study makes a us...
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作者：Busco, Cristiano; Quattrone, Paolo
作者单位：Ollscoil na Gaillimhe-University of Galway; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Research on the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has questioned whether its adoption generates greater integration between financial and nonfinancial performance measures, supports strategy implementation, increases performance and improves strategic decision making. This research has also highlighted how the BSC often generates effects other than these. Building on studies that portray Performance Measurement Systems as intrinsically incomplete practices of representation, the purpose of this article...
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作者：Labro, Eva
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：In this discussion, I use Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf, hereafter HKM, as a point of departure from which to discuss the current state of the two research areas to which they contribute. I will present some big-picture thoughts on research opportunities in their source literatures-the literature on financial management in health care and the literature on cost stickiness-and speculate as to where these literatures might go in the future.
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作者：Louis, Henock; Urcan, Oktay
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Dividend payments are generally costly to shareholders. One principal reason for such payments is that they force managers to raise funds in the external capital markets to finance new projects, which presumably reduces their incentives to engage in empire-building activities. We posit that, because accounting conservatism can also mitigate managers' incentives to engage in value-destroying projects, it could reduce the need for dividend payments and the associated costs. Accordingly, we find ...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market-wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capit...
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作者：Westermann, Kimberly D.; Bedard, Jean C.; Earley, Christine E.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Bentley University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Providence College
摘要：We investigate how auditors learn the technical aspects of their professional role while performing client engagements, and how that learning process has been shaped by changes in societal, economic, and regulatory forces. Prior studies explicitly recognize that auditors need social skills and demeanor consistent with professional norms as well as requisite knowledge, but those studies generally focus on the processes through which new auditors are molded toward consistency with social norms. ...
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作者：Kim, Yongtae; Li, Haidan; Li, Siqi
作者单位：Santa Clara University
摘要：This study examines whether CEO equity incentives have an impact on audit pricing. Prior studies investigate whether CEO equity incentives motivate executives to manage earnings for personal financial gains. Our focus is on whether auditors perceive CEO equity incentives to be associated with greater earnings manipulation risk and incorporate such risk in their pricing decisions. We find that CEO equity portfolio vega is positively related to audit fees after controlling for other determinants...
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作者：Cheng, C. S. Agnes; Huang, Henry He; Li, Yinghua
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Yeshiva University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Hedge fund intervention has been associated with many positive corporate changes and is an important vehicle for informed shareholder monitoring. Effective monitoring has also been positively associated with accounting conservatism. Building upon these prior results, we predict an increase in accounting conservatism after hedge fund intervention. We use a large sample of hedge fund activist events and identify control firms with similar likelihoods of being targeted using the propensity score ...
