Discretionary Disclosures to Risk-Averse Traders: A Research Note
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jorgensen, Bjorn N.; Kirschenheiter, Michael T.
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
刊物名称：
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0823-9150
DOI：
10.1111/1911-3846.12125
发表日期：
2015
页码：
1224-1235
关键词：
摘要：
Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk-averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that would arise when all traders have constant risk tolerance. We show that these endogenously determined prices are inconsistent with the assumed prices in Verrecchia (1983) when the manager elects to not disclose. We derive the manager's disclosure strategy for our setting and extend the comparative static results in Verrecchia (1990) for risk-neutral traders to a setting where traders have constant risk tolerance and prices are endogenously derived. Further, in our setting, discretionary disclosure does not affect how traders price risk of different outcomes. Also, we offer a representation of risk-averse traders' prices using risk-adjusted distributions. Finally, these results provide implications for empirical-archival discretionary disclosure studies.
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