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作者:Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian; Yoon, Dae-Hee
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yonsei University
摘要:Firms' reluctance at times to publicly disclose financial information is often attributed to concern that the information may be used against them by self-interested outside parties. These outside parties may interact with the firm in the horizontal realm (e.g., retail competitors) or in the vertical arena (e.g., wholesale suppliers). This article is built on the premise that fully understanding the strategic consequences of disclosure requires joint consideration of horizontal and vertical re...
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作者:Carrington, Thomas; Johansson, Tobias; Johed, Gustav; Ohman, Peter
作者单位:Stockholm University; Orebro University; Stockholm School of Economics; Mid-Sweden University
摘要:Based on an analysis of questionnaire data from a large sample of certified auditors, we examine how the main type of client being served influences auditor conformity to the core values of their profession. We contrast auditors of (primarily) listed companies with auditors of (primarily) single member companies, that is, limited liability companies with a single owner who typically is also the only employee of the company. We show that these two groups of auditors differ in the extent to whic...
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作者:Baloria, Vishal P.; Klassen, Kenneth J.; Wiedman, Christine I.
作者单位:Boston College; University of Waterloo
摘要:Demand for disclosures on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues has increased dramatically. Using corporate political spending disclosures as our setting, we conduct a detailed inquiry of 541 political spending-related shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2012 to highlight the role of shareholder activism as a mechanism to motivate ESG disclosure. Unlike earlier studies, we examine both proposals that went to a vote and proposals that were withdrawn by the activist, allowing us to a...
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作者:Heese, Jonas
作者单位:Harvard University
摘要:I examine whether political influence as a response to voters' interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the SEC. I find that large employers are less likely to experience SEC enforcement actions. Next, I examine whether variations in politicians' sensitivity to employment levels result in variations in enforcement against large employers. I find that large employers are less likely to face enforcement actions during presidential elections if they are based in po...