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作者：DeZoort, Todd; Doxey, Marcus; Pollard, Troy
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：This study evaluates whether auditor use of root cause analysis (RCA) for an identified client misstatement affects auditors' assessments of underlying control issues and materiality in an integrated audit setting. We also test whether auditor cognitive style moderates these effects given prior findings that a misfit between task structure and cognitive style undermines performance. This research is motivated by concerns about integrated audit quality and auditors failing to consider control d...
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作者：Ke, Bin; Zhang, Xiaojun
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：We examine the efficacy of public enforcement in weak investor protection countries by examining the outcomes of a comprehensive public enforcement campaign in China. The campaign, launched in 2007, was designed to help enforce China's first mandatory Corporate Governance Code, issued in 2002. The 2007 campaign was characterized by several important features: (i) the campaign required firms to identify their problems before the securities regulators conducted on-site inspections; (ii) the camp...
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作者：Tang, Michael; Wang, Rencheng; Zhou, Yi
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Singapore Management University; Fudan University
摘要：This study examines how managers' use of expectation management is affected by their labor market mobility, which we measure by the enforceability of noncompete provisions in their employment contracts. Exploiting quasinatural experiments, our difference-in-differences analyses provide new causal insights to the growing literature on how managers' career concerns affect their disclosure choices. Consistent with a less mobile labor market imposing more pressure on managers to achieve earnings e...
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作者：Francis, Jere R.; Wang, Wei
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Technology Sydney; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer-tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect d...
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作者：He, Yue; Li, Bing; Liu, Zhenbin; Pittman, Jeffrey
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Baptist University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB's international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether US institutional investors hold larger equity stakes in these firms-a longstanding issue that reflects investor portfolio decisions-if their auditors are exposed to the threat of a PCAOB inspection. In a d...
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作者：Khurana, Inder K.; Lundstrom, Nathan G.; Raman, K. K.
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Kansas; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio
摘要：In this study, we investigate whether the increase in regulatory scrutiny epitomized by the initial PCAOB inspection impacted audit quality differentially for Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors to better understand the consequences of PCAOB inspections for different audit firm types. Because of competing views on the effect of PCAOB inspections, the relation between PCAOB inspections and the audit quality differential between Big 4 and other auditors is an empirical issue. Empirically, we take the e...
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作者：Li, Xiao; Ng, Jeffrey; Saffar, Walid
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on trade credit. We document that firms in countries that adopt IFRS receive more trade credit from their suppliers, consistent with improved financial reporting quality and comparability playing a role in facilitating informal financing. This increase is larger for countries with a low level of societal trust, a poor pre-IFRS-adoption information environment, and stronger legal enforcement. These cross-sectional results suggest that the con...
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作者：Dou, Yiwei; Xu, Zhaoxia
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Understanding the role of bank lending in corporate innovation is important to policymakers, practitioners, and academics. We provide new evidence on such a role by exploiting the implementation of SFAS 166/167, which removed the off-balance sheet status of certain securitized assets of banks. The regulation affects bank lending and thus represents a credit supply shock to borrowing firms. We find that affected banks raise spreads and cut loan amounts after the regulation. Firms that borrow fr...
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作者：Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Huang, Sheng; Maharaja, Johan
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); China Europe International Business School; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：We examine the extent to which deferred vesting of stock and option grants (deferred pay) helps firms retain executives. To the extent an executive forfeits all deferred pay if they leave the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of an early exit. The impact of deferred pay on executive retention, a key ingredient for firms to create shareholder value is hence an important empirical issue. Using pay duration proposed in Gopalan et al. (2014) as a measure of the exten...
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作者：Lunawat, Radhika; Waymire, Gregory; Xin, Baohua
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Emory University; University of Toronto
摘要：A common view is that verified earnings reports encourage investment through improved transparency. We lack direct evidence on this foundational proposition because researchers cannot observe counterfactuals in which a manager either (i) must remain silent about performance or (ii) can make any statement about performance they desire, even a bald-faced lie. We experimentally manipulate whether a manager can provide information to an investor by voluntarily disclosing a verified earnings report...
