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作者：Campbell, John L.; D'Adduzio, Jenna; Downes, Jimmy F.; Utke, Steven
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of British Columbia; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; University of Connecticut
摘要：Cash flow hedge derivatives are an example of an economic transaction that is not fully portrayed in the financial statements in two key ways. First, while changes in the fair value of the derivative are recorded at each reporting date, changes in the value of the underlying purchase or sale commitment are not recorded or disclosed until that transaction occurs. Therefore, until the purchase or sale occurs, the financial statements only portray half of the economic transaction. Second, the gai...
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作者：Grabner, Isabella; Moers, Frank
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We investigate the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations-that is, corrective changes to the budget made during the year. Using proprietary data from a large consumer goods manufacturer, we analyze the extent to which initial budgeting decisions drive reallocations. Examining this relationship is important because initial budget negotiations are often troubled by power struggles and politicking, which may give rise to the need for reallocations. We hypothesize that one important...
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作者：Guo, Feng; Lin, Chenxi; Masli, Adi; Wilkins, Michael S.
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Kansas
摘要：In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first-time going concern opin...
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作者：Knechel, W. Robert; Mao, Juan; Qi, Baolei; Zhuang, Zili
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Auckland; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; Xi'an Jiaotong University; Xinjiang University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study investigates why auditors leave public accounting and the consequences of auditor departures, both of which have been of great concern for audit firms and regulators worldwide. Using data from China and controlling for demographics, we find that audit partners and managers, auditors who generate more revenue, and auditors who provide higher audit quality have a lower likelihood of departure, while non-Big 4 auditors have a higher likelihood of departing public accounting. We also fi...
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作者：Liu, Xinming; Lobo, Gerald J.; Yu, Hung-Chao
作者单位：Xiamen University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; National Chengchi University
摘要：Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms...
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作者：Hofmann, Christian; Indjejikian, Raffi J.
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study three elements of management control: incentive compensation, performance monitoring, and delegation of authority to managers to contract with lower-level employees. Using a principal-agent model, we highlight important direct and indirect interactions between and among these endogenous control elements, themes often emphasized in the economics and accounting literatures using the analogy of a three-legged stool. We identify circumstances in which control elements are complements or s...
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作者：Austin, Ashley A.; Carpenter, Tina D.; Christ, Margaret H.; Nielson, Christy S.
作者单位：University of Richmond; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Mississippi
摘要：Data analytics is transforming our global markets and significantly impacting the financial reporting environment. We investigate how auditors, company managers, and regulation interact with data analytics and one another to affect the diffusion (i.e., development and spread) of data analytics throughout the financial reporting environment. We interview company managers and their audit partners, as well as additional stakeholders, including regulators. We interpret findings from our interviews...
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作者：Sun, Estelle Y.
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper documents a differential role of R&D versus selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) for real earnings management. The distinction of these two components is important because prior studies mostly examine their combined use, but firms could manipulate them differently given the differing valuation implications. Reduced SG&A is viewed positively by investors as evidence of cost reduction, while reduced R&D is viewed negatively by investors as such expenditures are critica...
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作者：Yeo, Feng
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要：I conduct an experiment with senior executives (CEOs, CFOs, controllers) to examine how their risk disclosure quality, with respect to disclosure volume and specificity, is influenced by three factors: first, whether the disclosure behavior is framed internally by the firm as obtaining a gain or avoiding a loss from disclosure; second, whether the external disclosure regime mandates risk mitigation disclosures that explain how a risk is handled; and third, whether the risk under consideration ...
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作者：Kim, Mark P.; Pierce, Spencer R.; Yeung, Ira
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of British Columbia
摘要：Prior studies find that delayed earnings announcements tend to communicate unfavorable news, and investors react negatively when firms delay earnings announcements. However, these findings do not explain why investors discount delayed earnings, even after controlling for the earnings news, and why firms sometimes announce good news late. Motivated by theory from Trueman (1990) that attempts to explain these phenomena, we examine whether announcement delays indicate earnings management. We pred...
