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作者：Van den Schrieck, Jean-Christophe; Aksin, Zeynep; Chevalier, Philippe
作者单位：Koc University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This study considers the staffing problem of a vendor call center in a co-sourcing setting. The aim is to take short-term variability and correlations in time for call arrivals at such a vendor call center into account. To do so, peakedness is proposed as a useful measure of the burstiness in the arrival stream. The study empirically demonstrates the presence of bursty arrivals at a call center and proposes an approach to the measurement of the peakedness of the arrival stream making use of st...
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作者：Haruvy, Ernan; Leszczyc, Peter T. L. Popkowski; Ma, Yu
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Alberta; Renmin University of China
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作者：Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J.; Mak, Vincent
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Arizona; University of Cambridge
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作者：Chen, Lucy Gongtao; Ding, Ding; Ou, Jihong
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：This paper studies the impact of supply chain power structure on firms' profitability in an assembly system with one assembler and two suppliers. Two power regimes are investigated-in a Single Power Regime, a more powerful firm acts as the Stackelberg leader to decide the wholesale price but not the quantity whereas in a Dual Power Regime, both the price and quantity decisions are granted to the more powerful firm. Tallying the power positions of the three firms, for each power regime we study...
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作者：Cai, Gangshu (George); Chen, Xiangfeng; Xiao, Zhiguo
作者单位：Santa Clara University; Fudan University; Fudan University
摘要：This study investigates the roles of bank and trade credits in a supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer facing demand uncertainty. We evaluate the retailer's optimal order quantity and the creditors' optimal credit limits and interest rates in two scenarios. In the single-credit scenario, we find the retailer prefers trade credit, if the trade credit market is more competitive than the bank credit market; otherwise, the retailer's preference of a specific credit type depends on the r...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Wu, Diana Yan; Chen, Kay-Yut
作者单位：University of Kansas; Hewlett-Packard
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作者：Hsiao, Lu; Chen, Ying-Ju
作者单位：National Chung Hsing University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Rapid advances of information technology in recent years have enabled both the manufacturers and the retailers to operate their own Internet channels. In this study, we investigate the interaction between the capabilities of introducing the Internet channels, the pricing strategies, and the channel structure. We classify consumers into two segments: grocery shoppers attach a higher utility from purchasing through the physical channel, whereas a priori Internet shoppers prefer purchasing online...
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作者：Peng, David Xiaosong; Heim, Gregory R.; Mallick, Debasish N.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; University of St Thomas Minnesota
摘要：Collaboration is an essential element of new product development (NPD). This research examines the associations between four types of information technology (IT) tools and NPD collaboration. The relationships between NPD practices and NPD collaboration are also examined. Drawing on organizational information processing theory, we propose that the relationships between IT tools and NPD collaboration will be moderated differently by three project complexity dimensions, namely, product size, proj...
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作者：Mu, Liying; Dawande, Milind; Mookerjee, Vijay
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Quality issues in milk-arising primarily from deliberate adulteration by producers-have been reported in several developing countries. In the milk supply chain, a station buys raw milk from a number of producers, mixes the milk and sells it to a firm (that then sells the processed milk to end consumers). We study a non-cooperative game between a station and a population of producers. Apart from penalties on proven low-quality producers, two types of incentives are analyzed: confessor rewards f...
