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作者:Molavi, Pooya; Eksin, Ceyhun; Ribeiro, Alejandro; Jadbabaie, Ali
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要:We study a dynamic game in which short-run players repeatedly play a symmetric, strictly supermodular game whose payoffs depend on a fixed unknown state of nature. Each short-run player inherits the beliefs of his immediate predecessor in addition to observing the actions of the players in his social neighborhood in the previous stage. Because of the strategic complementary between their actions, players have the incentive to coordinate with others and learn from them. We show that in any Mark...
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作者:Lobel, Ilan; Sadler, Evan
作者单位:New York University
摘要:We study a sequential model of Bayesian social learning in networks in which agents have heterogeneous preferences, and neighbors tend to have similar preferences-a phenomenon known as homophily. We find that the density of network connections determines the impact of preference diversity and homophily on learning. When connections are sparse, diverse preferences are harmful to learning, and homophily may lead to substantial improvements. In contrast, in a dense network, preference diversity i...
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作者:Raginsky, Maxim; Nedic, Angelia
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要:We study a model of collective real-time decision making (or learning) in a social network operating in an uncertain environment, for which no a priori probabilistic model is available. Instead, the environment's impact on the agents in the network is seen through a sequence of cost functions, revealed to the agents in a causal manner only after all the relevant actions are taken. There are two kinds of costs: individual costs incurred by each agent and local-interaction costs incurred by each...
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作者:Alaei, Saeed; Jain, Kamal; Malekian, Azarakhsh
作者单位:Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of Toronto
摘要:We present an exact characterization of utilities in competitive equilibria of two-sided matching markets in which the utility of each agent depends on the choice of partner and the terms of the partnership, potentially including monetary transfer. Examples of such markets include sellers and buyers or jobs and workers. Demange and Gale showed that the set of competitive equilibria in this type of market forms a complete lattice with each extreme point of the lattice representing an equilibriu...
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作者:Anderson, Edward; Gamarnik, David; Kleywegt, Anton; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位:University of Sydney; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者:Dahleh, Munther A.; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza; Tsitsiklis, John N.; Zoumpoulis, Spyros I.
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; INSEAD Business School
摘要:We study the role of local information channels in enabling coordination among strategic agents. Building on the standard finite-player global games framework, we show that the set of equilibria of a coordination game is highly sensitive to how information is locally shared among different agents. In particular, we show that the coordination game has multiple equilibria if there exists a collection of agents such that (i) they do not share a common signal with any agent outside of that collect...
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作者:Shi, Guodong; Proutiere, Alexandre; Johansson, Mikael; Baras, John S.; Johansson, Karl H.
作者单位:Australian National University; Royal Institute of Technology; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要:We study the evolution of opinions (or beliefs) over a social network modeled as a signed graph. The sign attached to an edge in this graph characterizes whether the corresponding individuals or end nodes are friends (positive links) or enemies (negative links). Pairs of nodes are randomly selected to interact over time, and when two nodes interact, each of them updates its opinion based on the opinion of the other node and the sign of the corresponding link. This model generalizes the DeGroot...
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作者:Zhou, Junjie; Chen, Ying-Ju
作者单位:Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要:As various firms initially make information and access to their products/services scarce within a social network, identifying influential players emerges as a pivotal step for their success. In this paper, we tackle this problem using a stylized model that features payoff externalities and local network effects. The network designer is allowed to release information to only a subset of players (leaders); these targeted players make their contributions first and the rest (followers) move subseq...
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作者:Shah, Devavrat; Zaman, Tauhid
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We consider the problem of detecting the source of a rumor which has spread in a network using only observations about which set of nodes are infected with the rumor and with no information as to when these nodes became infected. In a recent work (Shah and Zaman 2010), this rumor source detection problem was introduced and studied. The authors proposed the graph score function rumor centrality as an estimator for detecting the source. They establish it to be the maximum likelihood estimator wi...
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作者:Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Yildiz, Ercan
作者单位:Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:Recent advances in information technology have allowed firms to gather vast amounts of data regarding consumers' preferences and the structure and intensity of their social interactions. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of competition between firms that can target their marketing budgets to individuals embedded in a social network. We provide a sharp characterization of the optimal targeted advertising strategies and highlight their dependence on the underlying social network structu...