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作者：Caldentey, Rene; Liu, Ying; Lobel, Ilan
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We consider the pricing problem faced by a monopolist who sells a product to a population of consumers over a finite time horizon. Customers' types differ along two dimensions: (i) their willingness-to-pay for the product and (ii) their arrival time during the selling season. We assume that the seller knows only the support of the customers' valuations and do not make any other distributional assumptions about customers' willingness-to-pay or arrival times. We consider a robust formulation of ...
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作者：Mookerjee, Radha; Kumar, Subodha; Mookerjee, Vijay S.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：This study provides an approach to manage an ongoing Internet ad campaign that substantially improves the number of clicks and the revenue earned from clicks. The problem we study is faced by an Internet advertising firm (Chitika) that operates in the Boston area. Chitika contracts with publishers to place relevant advertisements (ads) over a specified period on publisher websites. Ad revenue accrues to the firm and the publisher only if a visitor clicks on an ad (i.e., we are considering the ...
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作者：Aksin, Zeynep; Ata, Baris; Emadi, Seyed Morteza; Su, Che-Lin
作者单位：Koc University; University of Chicago; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We undertake an empirical study of the impact of delay announcements on callers' abandonment behavior and the performance of a call center with two priority classes. A Cox regression analysis reveals that in this call center, callers' abandonment behavior is affected by the announcement messages heard. To account for this, we formulate a structural estimation model of callers' (endogenous) abandonment decisions. In this model, callers are forward-looking utility maximizers and make their aband...
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作者：Negahban, Sahand; Oh, Sewoong; Shah, Devavrat
作者单位：Yale University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The question of aggregating pairwise comparisons to obtain a global ranking over a collection of objects has been of interest for a very long time: be it ranking of online gamers (e.g., MSR's TrueSkill system) and chess players, aggregating social opinions, or deciding which product to sell based on transactions. In most settings, in addition to obtaining a ranking, finding 'scores' for each object (e.g., player's rating) is of interest for understanding the intensity of the preferences. In th...
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作者：Ruddell, K.; Philpott, A. B.; Downward, A.
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：Supply function equilibrium models are used to study electricity market auctions with uncertain demand. We study the effects on the supply function equilibrium of a tax, levied by the system operator, on the observed surplus of producers. Such a tax provides an incentive for producers to alter their offers to avoid the tax. We consider these incentives under both strategic and price-taking assumptions. The model is extended to a setting in which producers are taxed on the benefits accruing to ...
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作者：Correa, Jose; Harks, Tobias; Kreuzen, Vincent J. C.; Matuschke, Jannik
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; University of Augsburg; Maastricht University; Technical University of Munich
摘要：Public transit systems in major urban areas usually operate under deficits and therefore require significant subsidies. An important cause of this deficit, particularly in the developing world, is the high fare evasion rate mainly due to an ineffective control policy or the lack of it. In this paper we study new models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in transit networks based on bilevel programming. In the first level, the leader (the network operator) determines probabilities for in...
