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作者：Jiang, Daniel R.; Al-Kanj, Lina; Powell, Warren B.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Princeton University
摘要：Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), most famously used in game-play artificial intelligence (e.g., the game of Go), is a well-known strategy for constructing approximate solutions to sequential decision problems. Its primary innovation is the use of a heuristic, known as a default policy, to obtain Monte Carlo estimates of downstream values for states in a decision tree. This information is used to iteratively expand the tree toward regions of states and actions that an optimal policy might visit....
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作者：Rivera Letelier, Orlando; Espinoza, Daniel; Goycoolea, Marcos; Moreno, Eduardo; Munoz, Gonzalo
作者单位：Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Universidad de O'Higgins
摘要：Given a discretized representation of an ore body known as a block model, the open pit mining production scheduling problem that we consider consists of defining which blocks to extract, when to extract them, and how or whether to process them, in such a way as to comply with operational constraints and maximize net present value. Although it has been established that this problem can be modeled with mixed-integer programming, the number of blocks used to represent real-world mines (millions) ...
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作者：Wagner, Laura; Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Lenient return policies enable consumers to return or exchange products they are unsatisfied with, which boosts sales. Unfortunately, they also increase retailer costs. We develop a search framework where consumers sequentially learn about products' true value and evaluate whether to keep, exchange, or return them. Our formulation results in a tractable attraction demand model that can be used for optimization. We show that when pricing is not a decision, the assortment problem does not have a...
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作者：Ba, Qin; Pang, Jong-Shi
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：This paper presents an exact penalization theory of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) that has its origin from the renowned Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium model. Whereas the latter model is the foundation of much of mathematical economics, the GNEP provides a mathematical model of multiagent noncooperative competition that has found many contemporary applications in diverse engineering domains. The most salient feature of the GNEP that distinguishes it from a standard ...
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作者：Lobel, Ilan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We consider the problem of dynamic pricing in the presence of patient consumers. We call a consumer patient if she is willing to wait a certain number of periods for a lower price and will purchase as soon as the price is equal to or below her valuation. We allow for arbitrary joint distributions of patience levels and valuations. We propose an efficient dynamic programming algorithm for finding optimal pricing policies. We find numerically that optimal policies can take the form of incomplete...
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作者：Zorc, Sasa; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Virginia; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We model two agents who can benefit from a mutual deal or partnership, yet are also searching for outside alternatives. This generic situation is observed in various settings (e.g., the job market for experts) and involves several decisions. The proposer decides not only on the timing, deadline, and value of her offer but also on how to handle her outside alternatives; the responder decides whether to accept the proposer's offer (if any) and how to handle his own outside alternatives. A respon...
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作者：Xiao, Shihong; Chen, Ying-Ju; Tang, Christopher
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In developing economies, smallholders apply their own specialized knowledge and exert costly effort to manage their farms. To raise overall productivity, NGOs and governments are advocating various knowledge-sharing and learning platforms for farmers to exchange a variety of farming techniques. Putting altruism aside, we examine the overall economic implications for heterogeneous farmers sharing their private knowledge voluntarily with others under (implicit) competition. By analyzing a multip...
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作者：Zhao, Ming; Zhang, Minjiao
作者单位：University of Delaware; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University
摘要：We study a multiechelon lot-sizing problem for a serial supply chain that consists of a production level and several transportation levels, where the demands can exist in the production echelon as well as in any transportation echelons. With the presence of stationary production capacity and general cost functions, our model integrates production, inventory, and transportation decisions and generalizes existing literature on many multiechelon lot-sizing models. First, we answer an open questio...
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作者：Malladi, Vishwakant; Mendoza-Arriaga, Rafael; Tompaidis, Stathis
作者单位：Indian School of Business (ISB); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We propose a framework to model dependence of outages of electric power plants. Our framework allows for common factors, such as weather events and fuel shortages, to drive outages. We calibrate our model for power plants in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council regions using a unique data set of actual outages from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. We find strong evidence of dependence in power plant outages based on the ...
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作者：Chu, Leon Yang; Rong, Ying; Zheng, Huan
作者单位：University of Southern California; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We study how the procurement process may help a buyer reduce purchasing costs under a dual-sourcing setting. First, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes when the buyer simultaneously or sequentially bilaterally negotiates with the suppliers. We establish coordination results and characterize the buyer's maximum equilibrium profit under such bilateral bargaining settings. Moreover, we show that the buyer can benefit from a request for proposal/quotation (RFx) stage that precedes the negotiation ...
