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作者：Renault, Jerome; Scarsini, Marco; Tornala, Tristan
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show...
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作者：Sethuraman, Jay; Tsitsiklis, John N.
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a generalization of the model of stochastic search in an out-forest, introduced and studied by E. V. Denardo, U. G. Rothblum, L. Van der Heyden. 2004. Index policies for stochastic search in a forest with an application to R&D project management. Math. Oper Res. 29(1) 162-181. We provide a simpler proof of the optimality of index-based policies.
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作者：Naniewicz, Zdzislaw
作者单位：Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw
摘要：The motivation for this paper is the Walrasian general equilibrium model of economy, as formulated by Arrow and Debreu [Arrow, K., G. Debreu. 1954. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22 264-290]. The problem considered takes the form of a system of variational inequalities on a reflexive Banach space as the infinite dimensional commodity space. The conditions sufficient for the existence of solutions are provided by means of the theory of pseudomonotone multiva...
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作者：Richman, Oran; Shimkin, Nahum
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider the problem of selfish routing in a congested network shared by several users, where each user wishes to minimize the cost of its own flow. Users are atomic, in the sense that each has a nonnegligible amount of flow demand, and flows may be split over different routes. The total cost for each user is the sum of its link costs, which, in turn, may depend on the user's own flow as well as the total flow on that link. Our main interest here is network topologies that ensure uniqueness...
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作者：Holzman, Ron; Peleg, Bezalel; Sudholter, Peter
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Southern Denmark
摘要：Let A be a finite set of in alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players, and let R-N be a profile of linear orders on A of the players. Let u(N) be a profile of utility functions for R-N. We define the nontransferable utility (NTU) game V-uN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for in <= 3, and it may be empty for in >= 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixe...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria (OE) in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network. We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the difference between users' willingness to pay and delay costs. We characterize a tight bound of 5/6 on efficiency in pure strategy equilibria when there is zero latency at zero flow and a tight bound ...
