A minority game with bounded recall

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renault, Jerome; Scarsini, Marco; Tornala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Luiss Guido Carli University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.1070.0284
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 873-889
• 关键词: 2-player repeated games; folk theorem; memory; equilibrium; EFFICIENCY; complexity

摘要

This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.