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作者：Koning, Rembrand; Hasan, Sharique; Chatterji, Aaron
作者单位：Harvard University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Recent scholarship argues that experimentation should be the organizing principle for entrepreneurial strategy. Experimentation leads to organizational learning, which drives improvements in firm performance. We investigate this proposition by exploiting the time-varying adoption of A/B testing technology, which has drastically reduced the cost of testing business ideas. Our results provide the first evidence on how digital experimentation affects a large sample of high-technology start-ups us...
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作者：Choo, Lawrence; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; University of Exeter; University of Haifa; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policymakers and managers use markets to guide policy and managerial decisions, interested parties may attempt to manipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We study experimentally the willingness of managers to base decisions on market information under the shadow of manipulation. We find that when there are manipulators in the market, managers under-utilize the information revealed in...
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作者：Golman, Russell; Loewenstein, George; Molnar, Andras; Saccardo, Silvia
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Chicago
摘要：Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual's d...
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作者：Altmann, Steffen; Traxler, Christian; Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; Hertie School; University of Kaiserslautern
摘要：This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging checkup appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients' behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines even if these are ...
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作者：Antonakis, John; d'Adda, Giovanna; Weber, Roberto A.; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Milan; University of Zurich
摘要：Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives and institutions, but also through personal abilities to persuade and motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention in the management literature, existing research has not yet established causal evidence for an effect of leader charisma on follower performance in incentivized and economically relevant situations. We r...
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作者：Blanchet, Jose; Chen, Lin; Zhou, Xun Yu
作者单位：Stanford University; Columbia University
摘要：We revisit Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio selection model by considering a distributionally robust version, in which the region of distributional uncertainty is around the empirical measure and the discrepancy between probability measures is dictated by theWasserstein distance. We reduce this problem into an empirical variance minimization problem with an additional regularization term. Moreover, we extend the recently developed inference methodology to our setting in order to select the ...
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作者：Manshadi, Vahideh; Rodilitz, Scott
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Nonprofit crowdsourcing platforms such as food recovery organizations rely on volunteers to perform time-sensitive tasks. Thus, their success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. To encourage volunteers to complete a task, platforms use nudging mechanisms to notify a subset of volunteers with the hope that at least one of them responds positively. However, because excessive notifications may reduce volunteer engagement, the platform faces a tradeoff between noti...
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作者：Cachon, Gerard P.; Kaaua, Dawson
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Georgetown University
摘要：Florida, an important state in presidential elections in the United States, has received considerable media coverage in recent years for long lines to vote. Do some segments of the population receive a disproportionate share of the resources to serve the voting process, which could encourage some or dissuade others from voting? We conduct the first empirical panel data study to examine whether minority and Democrat voters in Florida experience lower poll worker staffing, which could lengthen t...
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作者：Bonifonte, Anthony; Ayer, Turgay; Haaland, Benjamin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Denison University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Blood pressure (BP) is a significant controllable risk factor for cardiovascular disease (CVD), the leading cause of death worldwide. BP comprises two interrelated measurements: systolic and diastolic. CVD risk is minimized at intermediate BP values, a notion known as the J-curve effect. The J-curve effect imposes fundamental trade-offs in simultaneous management of systolic and diastolic BP; however, assessing a comprehensive set of joint systolic/diastolic BP treatment thresholds while expli...
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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Rivera, Alejandro; Wong, Tak-Yuen
作者单位：Boston University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic contracting (multitasking) model of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, and shareholders choose optimal debt and default policies. Excessive short-termism ex post is optimal for shareholders because debt has an asymmetric effect: shareholders receive all gains from short-termeffort but share gains fromlong-termeffort. We find that grimgrowth prospects and shareholder impatience imply higher optimal levels of short-t...
