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作者：Zhang, Shunyuan; Lee, Dokyun; Singh, Param Vir; Srinivasan, Kannan
作者单位：Harvard University; Boston University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study how Airbnb property demand changed after the acquisition of verified images (taken by Airbnb's photographers) and explore what makes a good image for an Airbnb property. Using deep learning and difference-in-difference analyses on an Airbnb panel data set spanning 7,423 properties over 16 months, we find that properties with verified images had 8.98% higher occupancy than properties without verified images (images taken by the host). To explore what constitutes a good image for an Air...
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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Rivera, Alejandro; Wong, Tak-Yuen
作者单位：Boston University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic contracting (multitasking) model of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, and shareholders choose optimal debt and default policies. Excessive short-termism ex post is optimal for shareholders because debt has an asymmetric effect: shareholders receive all gains from short-termeffort but share gains fromlong-termeffort. We find that grimgrowth prospects and shareholder impatience imply higher optimal levels of short-t...
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作者：Wu, Xiaole; Zhang, Fuqiang; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Fudan University; Washington University (WUSTL); Chongqing University
摘要：When a weak-brand firm and a strong-brand firm source from a common contract manufacturer, the weak-brand firm may advertise this relationship to promote its own product. This paper investigates whether the weak-brand firm should use such brand spillover as a marketing strategy and how this decision depends on the firms' characteristics and market conditions. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one contract manufacturer and two firms with asymmetric brand power. The contract manufa...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. We distinguish between complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state of the world and incomplete contracts renegotiated whenever the state of the world changes. We provide conditions such that incomplete contracting does not pose a problem. If the changing state of the world is publicly observable and t...
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作者：Dimmock, Stephen G.; Huang, Jiekun; Weisbenner, Scott J.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how access to high-skill labor affects the outcomes of start-up firms. We obtain exogenous variation in firms' ability to access skilled labor by using win rates in H-1B visa lotteries. Relative to other firms that also applied for H-1B visas, firms with higher lottery win rates are more likely to receive additional venture capital funding and to have a successful exit via an IPO or acquisition. H-1B visa lottery winners also subsequently receive more patents and patent citations. Ove...
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作者：Althuizen, Niek; Chen, Bo
作者单位：Montpellier Business School; Universite de Montpellier; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：When soliciting novel product ideas from the crowd, companies may opt to show a prototype in order to steer the generation of ideas in the desired direction. On the one hand, the more features the prototype incorporates, the larger the potential for activating relevant knowledge in memory that may serve as a basis for generating novel ideas. On the other hand, it increases the risk of fixation on the incorporated features, which may inhibit the generation of novel ideas. Based on the dual path...
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作者：Ciocan, Dragos Florin; Misic, Velibor V.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Optimal stopping is the problem of deciding when to stop a stochastic system to obtain the greatest reward, arising in numerous application areas such as finance, healthcare, and marketing. State-of-the-art methods for high-dimensional optimal stopping involve approximating the value function or the continuation value and then using that approximation within a greedy policy. Although such policies can perform very well, they are generally not guaranteed to be interpretable; that is, a decision...
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作者：Martel, Jordan; Van Wesep, Edward Dickersin; Van Wesep, Robert
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Researchers have often attributed discrete messages such as ratings to a difference in preferences between sender and receiver. By extending a standard model of information transmission, we show that discreteness can also arise when preferences are identical but misinterpretation is possible. Whereas discrete messages are less precise, they are easier to interpret. We provide predictions for the distribution of ratings. If we believe that an observed distribution results from cooperative behav...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We propose a model of how the retention motive shapes managerial compensation contracts. Once employed, a risk-averse manager acquires imperfectly portable skills whose value is stochastic because of industry-wide demand shocks. The manager's actions are uncontractible, and the perceived fairness of the compensation contract affects the manager's motivation. If the volatility of profits is sufficiently large and outside offers are suffi-ciently likely, the equilibrium contract combines a salar...
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作者：Zhang, Chenglong; Chen, Jianqing; Raghunathan, Srinivasan
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine competition between two-sided platforms in a sharing economy. In sharing economies, workers self-schedule their supply based on the wage they receive. The platforms compete for workers as well as consumers. To attract workers, platforms use diverse wage schemes, including fixed commission rate, dynamic commission rate, and fixed wage. We develop a model to examine the impacts of the self-scheduled nature of the supply on competing platforms and the role of the wage scheme in the pla...
