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作者：Andreicovici, Ionela; Bormann, Sara; Hombach, Katharina
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We examine the effect of trade secret protection laws on internal information integration (i.e., the extent to which economic agents are provided with access to decisionrelevant information from other economic agents within a firm). We argue that stronger trade secret protection laws increase firms' internal information integration because they reduce the proprietary costs of information leakage. To test our prediction, we measure a firm's internal information integration by the share of its s...
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作者：Roels, Guillaume; Corbett, Charles J.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Workers in knowledge-intensive industries often complain of having too many meetings, but organizations still give little thought to deciding when or how often to meet. We investigate the efficiency and robustness of various coordination scheduling rules. We consider workers who are engaged in a common activity (e.g., software programming) that can be divided into largely independent, parallel production tasks, but that necessitates periodic coordination. Coordination enables workers to addres...
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作者：Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Pettus, Jett; Tadelis, Steven
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Amazon.com; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Bargaining breakdown is common in bargaining in environments with incomplete information. We study whether, in these environments, permitting communication impacts bargaining outcomes. On May 23, 2016, eBay Germany's Best Offer platform introduced unstructured communication allowing desktop users, but not mobile users, to accompany offers with a message. Using this natural experiment, our difference-in-differences approach documents a 14% decrease in the rate of breakdown among compliers. Thou...
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作者：Cachon, Gerard P.; Dizdarer, Tolga; Tsoukalas, Gerry
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; Boston University
摘要：An open debate in platform design is who should control pricing: the platform (centralized pricing) or its service providers (decentralized pricing). We show that a key trade-off is between regulating competition and enabling price tailoring. Centralized pricing allows the platform to manage competition, but it faces information asymmetry as it cannot observe agent costs. Decentralized pricing lets agents adjust prices to their costs, but without oversight, competition can become too strong (p...
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作者：Debo, Laurens G.; Snitkovsky, Ran I.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Tipping is a complex phenomenon cutting across various stakeholders-firms, customers, and workers. Analyzing the long-run impact of policies related to tipping is therefore challenging. To facilitate such analysis, we develop a modeling framework in which a tipping norm forms endogenously in a market consisting of a firm that offers service to potential customers. Customers choose whether to consume the service or not and, if yes, how much to tip the server afterward. With tipping, customers s...
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作者：Ashraf, Anik
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Performance ranking can trigger multiple social incentives for workers. On one hand, it offers status rewards to induce them to increase effort. On the other, better-ranked workers may reduce effort to conform to coworkers' productivity in fear of social retribution. This paper uses a field experiment in a sweater factory to disentangle the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive ranks either privately or publicly. I find that private ranks do not have any effect on av...
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作者：Cont, Rama; Cucuringu, Mihai; Xu, Renyuan; Zhang, Chao
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Oxford; New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou)
摘要：The estimation of loss distributions for dynamic portfolios requires the simulation of scenarios representing realistic joint dynamics of their components. We propose a novel data-driven approach for simulating realistic, high-dimensional multiasset scenarios, focusing on accurately representing tail risk for a class of static and dynamic trading strategies. We exploit the joint elicitability property of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall to design a Generative Adversarial Network that learn...
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作者：Belenzon, Sharon; Cioaca, Larisa
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tulane University
摘要：The U.S. government incentivizes firms to develop innovative technologies by awarding research and development (R&D) contracts that often carry an implicit promise of guaranteed demand. Firms that demonstrate strong technological capabilities are rewarded with noncompetitive production contracts for the resulting products and services. Using newly assembled data on $4.2 trillion in government procurement contracts from all federal agencies, matched to U.S. publicly traded firms, we document a ...
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作者：Guo, Cheng; Bodur, Merve; Taylor, Joshua A.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Edinburgh; University of Edinburgh; Heriot Watt University; New Jersey Institute of Technology
摘要：Optimization problems with discrete decisions are nonconvex and thus lack strong duality, which limits the usefulness of tools such as shadow prices. It was shown in Burer (2009) that mixed-binary quadratic programs can be written as completely positive programs, which are convex. We apply this perspective by writing unit commitment in power systems as a completely positive program and then using the dual copositive program and strong duality to design new pricing mechanisms. We show that the ...
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作者：Lu, Tao; Tomlin, Brian
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Dartmouth College
摘要：A canonical setting in supply chain research is one in which a retailer sources a product, under a wholesale price contract, from a manufacturer that invests in capacity in advance of the retailer's order. When the retailer possesses private information about demand, it is well understood that credible cheap-talk communication is not possible absent considerations of trust or the reactive setting of the wholesale price. This understanding is based on the practice of demand information being sh...
