Communication, Learning, and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Pettus, Jett; Tadelis, Steven
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Amazon.com; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00366
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: economics: game theory and bargaining theory; industrial organization: market structure; Firm strategy; and market performance; economics: behavior and behavioral decision making; market design

摘要

Bargaining breakdown is common in bargaining in environments with incomplete information. We study whether, in these environments, permitting communication impacts bargaining outcomes. On May 23, 2016, eBay Germany's Best Offer platform introduced unstructured communication allowing desktop users, but not mobile users, to accompany offers with a message. Using this natural experiment, our difference-in-differences approach documents a 14% decrease in the rate of breakdown among compliers. Though adoption is immediate, the effect is not. We show, using text analysis, that the dynamics are consistent with repeat players learning how to use communication in bargaining. Finally, tying the two results together, we show that messages that emulate the text content of experienced sellers are more likely to be accepted.