作者：SRINIVASAN, K
摘要：A low-cost incumbent may limit price to informatively signal her cost to an uncertain potential entrant, and therefore deter entry. We enrich this model by investigating the strategic pricing behavior of the incumbent when she operates in multiple markets. We demonstrate that the low-cost incumbent's ability to separate from a ghost high-cost type is enhanced when she combines her signalling effort across markets, instead of independent signalling in each market. we show that, in the combined ...
作者：DREXL, A
摘要：A recurring problem in project management involves the allocation of scarce resources to the individual jobs comprising the project. In many situations such as audit scheduling, the resources correspond to individuals (skilled labour). This naturally leads to an assignment type project scheduling problem, i.e. a project has to be processed by assigning one of several individuals (resources) to each job. In this paper we consider the nonpreemptive variant of a resource-constrained project job-a...
