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作者：Chen, FR; Zenios, SA
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University
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作者：Gibbons, R
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory (i.e., the economic theory of incentives) during the 1990s, with an eye toward applications to supply transactions. I emphasize six recent models, in three pairs: (1) new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts, (2) new directions in incentive theory, and (3) new applications to supply transactions. By reviewing these six models, I hope to establish three things. First, the theory of incentive contracts needed and received ...
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作者：Iyer, AV; Schwarz, LB; Zenios, SA
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper develops and analyzes a principal-agent model for product specification and production motivated by core buying decisions at an automobile manufacturer. The model focuses on two important elements of the core buyer's responsibility: (1) assessing the supplier's capability, and (2) allocating some or all of a fixed level of some buyer-internal resource to help the supplier. Under the contracting scheme we model, the buyer (principal) delegates the majority of product specification an...
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作者：Chen, FR
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve. They possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions. A key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market and to work hard. Many people have considered this question and provided solutions. Perhaps the most well-known solution is due to Gonik (1978), who proposed and implemented a clever scheme designed to...
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作者：Cachon, GP; Lariviere, MA
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
摘要：Under a revenue-sharing contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates. Such contracts have become more prevalent in the videocassette rental industry relative to the more conventional wholesale price contract. This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by each retailer's purchase quantity and price. Demand can be deterministic or stochastic and re...
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作者：Narayanan, VG; Raman, A; Singh, J
作者单位：Harvard University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：In this paper, we model a manufacturer that contracts with two retailers, who then choose retail prices and stocking quantities endogenously in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If the manufacturer designs a contract that is accepted by both retailers, it sets the wholesale price as a compromise between two conflicting roles: reducing intrabrand retail price competition and inducing retailers to stock closer to first-best levels (that is, optimum for the supply chain as a whole). In equilibrium, fi...
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作者：Bernstein, F; Federgruen, A
作者单位：Duke University; Columbia University
摘要：In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We also design contractual arrangements between the parties that allow the decentralized chain to perform as well as a centralized one. We address these questions in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of (competing) retailers, considering the following general model: Retailers face random demands, the distribut...
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作者：Gallien, J; Wein, LM
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University
摘要：We address the problem of designing multi-item procurement auctions for a monopsonistic buyer in capacity-constrained environments. Using insights from classical auction theory, we construct an optimization-based auction mechanism (smart market) relying on the dynamic resolution of a linear program minimizing the buyer's cost under the suppliers' capacity constraints. Suppliers can modify their offers in response to the optimal allocation corresponding to each set of bids, giving rise to a dyn...
