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作者：Schmidt, Klaus M.; Spann, Martin; Zeithammer, Robert
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Munich; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Pay what you want (PWYW) can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller c...
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作者：Chang, Wei-Shiun; Chen, Bo; Salmon, Timothy C.
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Southern Methodist University
摘要：In a procurement context, it can be quite costly for a buyer when the winning seller underestimates the cost of a project and then defaults on the project midway through completion. The average bid auction is one mechanism intended to help address this problem. This format involves awarding the contract to the bidder who has bid closest to the average of the bids submitted. We compare the performance of this mechanism with the standard low price mechanism to determine how successful the averag...
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作者：Brenner, Steffen
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：In this paper, I elicit risk attitudes of U.S. executives by calibrating a subjective option valuation model for option exercising data (1996 to 2008), yielding approximately 65,000 values of relative risk aversion (RRA) for almost 7,000 executives. The observed behavior is generally consistent with moderate risk aversion and a median (mean) RRA close to one (three). Values are validated for chief executive officers (CEOs) by testing theory-based predictions on the influence of individual char...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price-setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations. The analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms. We show that, in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital, nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins. Otherwise, firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in t...
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作者：Ye, Shengqi; Aydin, Goker; Hu, Shanshan
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Consider a retailer using sponsored search marketing together with dynamic pricing. The retailer's bid on a search keyword affects the retailer's rank among the search results. The higher the rank, the higher the customer traffic and the customers' willingness to pay will be. Thus, the question arises: When a retailer bids higher to attract more customers, should the accompanying price also decrease (to strengthen the bid's effect on demand) or increase (to take advantage of higher willingness...
