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作者：Iyer, Rajkamal; Khwaja, Asim Ijaz; Luttmer, Erzo F. P.; Shue, Kelly
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers' creditworthiness. We find that these peer lenders predict an individual's likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45% greater accuracy than the borrower's exact credit score (unobserved by the lenders, who only see a credit category). Moreover, peer lenders achieve 87% of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borro...
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作者：Ren, Yuqing; Chen, Jilin; Riedl, John
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Online open collaboration efforts, such as Wikipedia articles and open source software development, often involve a large crowd with diverse experiences and interests. Diversity, on the one hand, facilitates the access to and integration of a wide variety of information; on the other hand, it may cause conflict and hurt group performance. Although diversity's effects have been the subject of many studies in offline work groups (with the results remaining inconclusive), its effects in online se...
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作者：Nair, Jayakrishnan; Wierman, Adam; Zwart, Bert
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In this paper, we consider the problem of capacity provisioning for an online service supported by advertising. We analyse the strategic interaction between the service provider and the user base in this setting, modeling positive network effects, as well as congestion sensitivity in the user base. We focus specifically on the influence of positive network effects, as well as the impact of noncooperative behavior in the user base on the firm's capacity provisioning decision and its profit. Our...
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes
作者单位：University of Rochester; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Zurich
摘要：It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly assign career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face different external career opportunities depending on their nationality. We test whether the career prospect of being selected to a Euro Cup national team affects players' pre-cup performances, using nationals of ...
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作者：Mollick, Ethan; Nanda, Ramana
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University
摘要：In fields as diverse as technology entrepreneurship and the arts, crowds of interested stakeholders are increasingly responsible for deciding which innovations to fund, a privilege that was previously reserved for a few experts, such as venture capitalists and grant-making bodies. Little is known about the degree to which the crowd differs from experts in judging which ideas to fund, and, indeed, whether the crowd is even rational in making funding decisions. Drawing on a panel of national exp...
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作者：Osadchiy, Nikolay; Gaur, Vishal; Seshadri, Sridhar
作者单位：Emory University; Cornell University; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：Industrial production output is generally correlated with the state of the economy. Nonetheless, during times of economic downturn, some industries take the biggest hit, whereas at times of economic boom they reap most benefits. To provide insight into this phenomenon, we map supply networks of industries and firms and investigate how the supply network structure mediates the effect of economy on industry or firm sales. Previous research has shown that retail sales are correlated with the stat...
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作者：Baum, Joel A. C.; Bowers, Anne; Mohanram, Partha
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Research in industrial organization and strategic management has shown that rivals competing with each other in multiple markets are more willing to show each other mutual forbearance, i.e., compete less aggressively, within their spheres of influence, i.e., the markets in which each firm dominates. Sell-side equity analysts typically cover multiple stocks in common with their rivals. We examine the impact of this multipoint contact for mutual forbearance on two key dimensions of competition a...
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作者：Nasser, Sherif; Turcic, Danko
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Previous studies have shown that quantity commitment by all firms in an industry mitigates price competition. This paper shows that when firms have a choice, asymmetric outcomes can arise, with some firms choosing to commit to a quantity and other firms choosing not to. To study the commitment decision, we analyze a multistage game within a duopoly of differentiated firms a la Hotelling. In the first stage of the game, firms choose whether or not to commit to a quantity. In the second stage, e...
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作者：Lobel, Ilan; Patel, Jigar; Vulcano, Gustavo; Zhang, Jiawei
作者单位：New York University; Montclair State University; New York University; NYU Shanghai
摘要：A technology firm launches newer generations of a given product over time. At any moment, the firm decides whether to release a new version of the product that captures the current technology level at the expense of a fixed launch cost. Consumers are forward-looking and purchase newer models only when it maximizes their own future discounted surpluses. We start by assuming that consumers have a common valuation for the product and consider two product launch settings. In the first setting, the...
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作者：Zhang, Yinghao; Donohue, Karen; Cui, Tony Haitao
作者单位：University System of Maryland; Salisbury University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Prior theory claims that buyback and revenue-sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel-coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier-retailer setting. This suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts. However, the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues (i.e., losses and gains) vary significantly between the contracts, suggesting the supplier's preference of contract type, and associated contract parameter values, may vary with the level of loss ...
