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作者：Cabral, Luis; Pacheco-de-Almeida, Goncalo
作者单位：New York University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider the formation of alliances that potentially create complementarities, that is, when the value function is supermodular in firm resources. We show that, in a frictionless world where information is perfect and managers optimize, firm alliances disproportionately increase the value of high-resource-level firms, resulting in higher variance and higher skewness of the distribution of firm value; moreover, higher-value alliances are subject to regression to the mean at a faster rate. Th...
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作者：Sunar, Nur; Birge, John R.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a day-ahead electricity market that consists of multiple competing renewable firms (e.g., wind generators) and conventional firms (e.g., coal-fired power plants) in a discrete-time setting. The market is run in every period, and all firms submit their price-contingent production schedules in every day-ahead market. Following the clearance of a day-ahead market, in the next period, each (renewable) firm chooses its production quantity (after observing its available supply). If a fir...
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作者：Cassar, Lea
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission-namely, to a social purpose beyond profit maximization. I use three laboratory experiments to investigate if employers can use the mission to economize on monetary incentives. In my first experiment, I exogenously vary whether the agents' effort generates a donation to a charity of their choice (matched mission), generates a donation to a charity chosen by another subject (random mission), or generates no donation (no mission). I find that the mis...
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作者：Gill, David; Kissova, Zdenka; Lee, Jaesun; Prowse, Victoria
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Tongji University
摘要：Rank-order relative-performance evaluation, in which pay, promotion, symbolic awards, and educational achievement depend on the rank of individuals in the distribution of performance, is ubiquitous. Whenever organizations use rank-order relative-performance evaluation, people receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort experiment, we aim to discover whether people respond to the specific rank that they achieve. In particular, we leverage random variation in the allocation of rank am...
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作者：Benjaafar, Saif; Kong, Guangwen; Li, Xiang; Courcoubetis, Costas
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：We describe an equilibrium model of peer-to-peer product sharing, or collaborative consumption, where individuals with varying usage levels make decisions about whether or not to own a homogeneous product. Owners are able to generate income from renting their products to nonowners while nonowners are able to access these products through renting on an as-needed basis. We characterize equilibrium outcomes, including ownership and usage levels, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We compare ea...
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作者：Chemama, Jonathan; Cohen, Maxime C.; Lobel, Ruben; Perakis, Georgia
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; New York University; Airbnb; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Governments use consumer incentives to promote green technologies (e.g., solar panels and electric vehicles). Our goal in this paper is to study how policy adjustments over time will interact with production decisions from the industry. We model the interaction between a government and an industry player in a two-period game setting under uncertain demand. We show how the timing of decisions affects the risk sharing between the government and the supplier, ultimately affecting the cost of the ...
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作者：Levi, Retsef; Magnanti, Thomas; Shaposhnik, Yaron
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Singapore University of Technology & Design; University of Rochester
摘要：We study a new class of scheduling problems that capture common settings in service environments, in which one has to serve a collection of jobs that have a priori uncertain attributes (e.g., processing times and priorities) and the service provider has to decide how to dynamically allocate resources (e.g., people, equipment, and time) between testing (diagnosing) jobs to learn more about their respective uncertain attributes and processing jobs. The former could inform future decisions, but c...
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作者：Mihm, Jurgen; Schlapp, Jochen
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Mannheim
摘要：It is notoriously difficult to provide outside parties with adequate incentives for innovation. Contests-in which solvers compete for a prize offered by the contest holder-have been shown to be an effective incentive mechanism. Despite considerable interest in this concept, we lack a thorough understanding of important aspects of contests; in particular, feedback from the contest holder to the solvers has received only limited attention. This paper discusses how contest holders can improve con...
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作者：Arlotto, Alessandro; Frazelle, Andrew E.; Wei, Yehua
作者单位：Duke University; Boston College
摘要：We study the behavior of strategic customers in an open-routing service network with multiple stations. When a customer enters the network, she is free to choose the sequence of stations that she visits, with the objective of minimizing her expected total system time. We propose a two-station game with all customers present at the start of service and deterministic service times, and we find that strategic customers herd, that is, in equilibrium all customers choose the same route. For unobser...
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作者：Casas-Arce, Pablo; Kittsteiner, Thomas; Asis Martinez-Jerez, F.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; RWTH Aachen University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior aimed at circumventing the original intention of the agreement governing their business relationship, complying with the letter but not the spirit of the contract. We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are typically not enough to prevent it when parties can renegotiate contractual outcomes. This is because contractually specified incentives in...
