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作者：Belavina, Elena; Marinesi, Simone; Tsoukalas, Gerry
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Lacking credible rule-enforcement mechanisms to punish misconduct, existing reward-based crowdfunding platforms can leave backers exposed to two risks: entrepreneurs may run away with backers' money (funds misappropriation), and product specifications may be misrepresented (performance opacity). We show that each of these risks can materially impact crowdfunding efficiency, and, when jointly present, they interact with each other in ways that can dampen or, more worryingly, amplify their indiv...
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作者：Cohen, Lauren; Lou, Dong; Malloy, Christopher J.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that cast their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long-short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points ...
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作者：DeValve, Levi; Pekec, Sasa; Wei, Yehua
作者单位：University of Chicago; Duke University
摘要：We study assemble-to-order (ATO) problems from the literature. ATO problems with general structure and integrality constraints are well known to be difficult to solve, and we provide new insight into these issues by establishing worst-case approximation guarantees through primal-dual analyses and linear programming (LP) rounding. First, we relax the one-period ATO problem using a natural newsvendor decomposition and use the dual solution for the relaxation to derive a lower bound on optimal co...
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作者：Meng, Xiaojing; Tian, Jie Joyce
作者单位：New York University; University of Waterloo
摘要：We investigate how board expertise affects chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and firm value. The CEO engages in a sequence of tasks: first acquiring information to evaluate a potential project, then reporting his or her assessment of the project to the board, and finally implementing the project if it is adopted. We demonstrate that the CEO receives higher compensation when the board agrees with the CEO on the assessment of the project. Board expertise leads to (weakly) better investmen...
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作者：Chen, Boxiao; Chao, Xiuli
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We consider an inventory control problem with multiple products and stockout substitution. The firm knows neither the primary demand distribution for each product nor the customers' substitution probabilities between products a priori, and it needs to learn such information from sales data on the fly. One challenge in this problem is that the firm cannot distinguish between primary demand and substitution (overflow) demand from the sales data of any product, and lost sales are not observable. ...
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作者：D'Annunzio, Anna; Russo, Antonio
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; Loughborough University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study the role of ad networks in the online advertising market. Our baseline model considers two publishers that can outsource the sale of their ad inventories to an ad network, in a market where consumers and advertisers multi-home. The ad network increases total advertising revenue by tracking consumers across outlets and reduces competition between publishers by centralizing the sale of ads. Consequently, outsourcing to the ad network benefits the publishers, but may penalize the adverti...
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作者：Long, Xiaoyang; Nasiry, Javad
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; McGill University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：When wages are transparent, sales agents may compare their pay with that of their peers and experience positive or negative feelings if those peers are paid (respectively) less or more. We investigate the implications of such social comparisons on sales agents' effort decisions and their incentives to help or collaborate with each other. We then characterize the firm's optimal sales force compensation scheme and the conditions under which wage transparency benefits the firm. Our results show t...
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作者：Cohen, Maxime C.; Lobel, Ilan; Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位：McGill University; New York University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider the problem faced by a firm that receives highly differentiated products in an online fashion. The firm needs to price these products to sell them to its customer base. Products are described by vectors of features and the market value of each product is linear in the values of the features. The firm does not initially know the values of the different features, but can learn the values of the features based on whether products were sold at the posted prices in the past. This model ...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Oery, Aniko
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University
摘要：We propose a model for word-of-mouth (WoM) management where a firm has two tools at hand: offering referral rewards and offering a free contract. Current customers' incentives to engage in WoM can affect the contracting problem of a firm in the presence of positive externalities of users. Formally, we consider a classic Maskin-Riley contracting problem for the receiver of WoM where the firm can pay the senders referral rewards and a sender experiences positive externalities if the receiver ado...
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作者：Joo, Mingyu; Gauri, Dinesh K.; Wilbur, Kenneth C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Temporal distance refers to the time between purchase and consumption in advanced-sales industries. We explore how the response of aggregate demand to price changes with temporal distance in a large, proprietary data set of Florida cruise prices, bookings, and product attributes. We offer the first evidence that cruise demand becomes more sensitive to price during the advance sales period, unlike extant findings in other settings. The results also show that demand is greatest late in the advan...
