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作者：Ranganathan, Aruna; Shivaram, Ranjitha
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Using ethnographic, personnel, and experimental data from an Indian garment factory, this paper investigates whether and how manager gender affects female worker productivity. We find that female managers motivate greater female worker productivity than male managers by engaging in subordinate scut work, the practice of voluntarily getting one's hands dirty to perform subordinates' routine tasks, which increases subordinates' engagement with their work. Our qualitative data help to generate hy...
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作者：Budanova, Sofya; Cianciaruso, Davide; Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stanford University
摘要：We study the consequences of misreporting in settings where ambiguity-averse investors face uncertainty about two aspects of the firm: its productivity and the weakness of its reporting system. We show that the joint presence of these two sources of uncertainty distorts the firm's investment choices in opposing ways, leading to overinvestment by large firms (to signal productivity) and underinvestment by small firms (to signal that the reporting system is not weak). Our analysis suggests that ...
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作者：Buell, Ryan W.; Campbell, Dennis; Frei, Frances X.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper investigates the impact of customer compatibility-the degree of fit between customers' needs and the capabilities of the operations serving them-on customer experiences and firm performance. We use variance decomposition analysis to quantify the relative importance of customer, employee, process, location, and market-level effects on customer satisfaction. In our models, which explain roughly a quarter of the aggregate variance, differences among customers account for 96%-97% of the...
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作者：Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper studies the effect of competition on opacity in the financial system. In my model, two financial institutions competing for investors simultaneously make a public disclosure decision when both are exposed to rollover risk. I find that in the face of rollover risk, competition between financial institutions has a nonmonotonic effect on their disclosure decisions. More intense competition can reduce disclosure and make the financial system more opaque, especially when investors? priva...
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作者：Aksin, Zeynep; Deo, Sarang; Jonasson, Jonas Oddur; Ramdas, Kamalini
作者单位：Koc University; Indian School of Business (ISB); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London Business School
摘要：In services where teams come together for short collaborations, managers are often advised to strive for high team familiarity so as to improve coordination and consequently, performance. However, inducing high team familiarity by keeping team membership intact can limit workers' opportunities to acquire useful knowledge and alternative practices from exposure to a broader set of partners. We introduce an empirical measure for prior partner exposure and estimate its impact (along with that of ...
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作者：Chiles, Bennett
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Firms in many industries engage in price obfuscation-tactics that intentionally make prices more difficult for consumers to discern. Although existing research has focused on the short-term financial gains that motivate firms to obfuscate, reputational concerns may at least partially counteract these incentives if consumers punish deceptive firms via loss of loyalty in future transactions and/or publicly observable negative feedback. This paper addresses the latter possibility, exploring the i...
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作者：Carletti, Elena; Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Marquez, Robert
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the consequences for supervisors' and banks' behavior of a huband-spokes supervisory system where a centralized agency has authority over banks but relies on local supervisors to collect actionable information. The model entails a principal-agent problem between central and local supervisors that leads to tougher supervisory standards but less compliance on the side of the supervised banks. Centralization entails greater inspection effort by the local supervisor and less bank risk tak...
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作者：Glosten, Lawrence; Nallareddy, Suresh; Zou, Yuan
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of exchange-traded funds' (ETFs') activity on the short-run informational efficiency of their underlying securities. We find that ETF activity increases short-run informational efficiency for stocks with weak information environments. The increase in informational efficiency results from the timely incorporation of systematic earnings information. In contrast, we find no such effect for stocks with stronger information environments. ETF activity increases ret...
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作者：Kouvelis, Panos; Xu, Fasheng
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Syracuse University
摘要：Factoring is a financial arrangement where the supplier sells accounts receivable to the factor against a premium and receives cash for immediate working capital needs. Reverse factoring takes advantage of the retailer's payment guarantee and the credit rating differential between a small supplier and a large retailer, enabling the supplier to receive financing at a more favorable rate. We develop a supply chain theory of (recourse/ non-recourse) factoring and reverse factoring showing when th...
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作者：Lu, Susan Feng; Serfes, Konstantinos; Wedig, Gerard; Wu, Bingxiao
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Drexel University; University of Rochester; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Competition plays an ambiguous role in nursing home markets where public and private payers coexist. Using U.S. nursing home data with a wide range of market structures, we find a U-shaped relationship between competition and service quality when nursing homes serve a mix of public and private segments, and a monotonically increasing relationship when nursing homes mostly serve the public, price-regulated, segment. The outcomes can be explained by the interplay of two opposing effects of compe...
