Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carletti, Elena; Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Marquez, Robert
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3448
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 455-470
• 关键词: centralized bank supervision; Bank risk taking; limited liability

摘要

We study the consequences for supervisors' and banks' behavior of a huband-spokes supervisory system where a centralized agency has authority over banks but relies on local supervisors to collect actionable information. The model entails a principal-agent problem between central and local supervisors that leads to tougher supervisory standards but less compliance on the side of the supervised banks. Centralization entails greater inspection effort by the local supervisor and less bank risk taking if the divergence in the intervention policy of the central and the local supervisors is sufficiently small, but less effort and riskier bank portfolios if the divergence is large. The model has implications for the design of supervisory frameworks within integrated economies.