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作者：Baron, Opher; Hu, Ming; Malekian, Azarakhsh
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study the revenue volatility of a monopolist selling a divisible good to consumers in the presence of local network externalities among consumers. The utility of consumers depends on their consumption level as well as those of their neighbors in a network through network externalities. In the eye of the seller, there exist uncertainties in the network externalities, which may be the result of unanticipated shocks or a lack of exact knowledge of the externalities. However, the seller has to ...
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作者：Lin, Meichun; Huh, Woonghee Tim; Krishnan, Harish; Uichanco, Joline
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We consider the data-driven newsvendor problem in which a manager makes inventory decisions sequentially and learns the unknown demand distribution based on observed samples of continuous demand (no truncation). We study the widely used sample average approximation (SAA) approach and analyze its performance with respect to regret, which is the difference between its expected cost and the optimal cost of the clairvoyant who knows the underlying demand distribution. We characterize how the regre...
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作者：Aouad, Ali; Saritac, Omer
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In centralized matching markets such as carpooling platforms and kidney exchange schemes, new participants constantly enter the market and remain available for potential matches during a limited period of time. To reach an efficient allocation, the ???timing??? of the matching decisions is a critical aspect of the platform???s operations. There is a fundamental tradeoff between increasing market thickness and mitigating the risk that participants abandon the market. Nonetheless, the dynamic pr...
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作者：Qu, Zihao; Dawande, Milind; Janakiraman, Ganesh
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Motivated by an application at a postacute healthcare provider, we study an infinite-horizon, stochastic optimization problem with a set of long-term capacity investment decisions and a sequence of real-time order acceptance/rejection decisions. The goal is to maximize the long-run average expected profit per period. The firm employs full-time resources of various kinds, such as nurses and therapists. For each kind of resource, multiple types are available. For example, registered nurses (RNs)...
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作者：Eckles, Dean; Esfandiari, Hossein; Mossel, Elchanan; Rahimian, M. Amin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study the task of selecting k nodes, in a social network of size n, to seed a diffusion with maximum expected spread size, under the independent cascade model with cascade probability p. Most of the previous work on this problem (known as influence maximization) focuses on efficient algorithms to approximate the optimal seed set with provable guarantees given knowledge of the entire network; however, obtaining full knowledge of the network is often very costly in practice. Here we develop a...
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作者：Wu, Lingxiao; Adulyasak, Yossiri; Cordeau, Jean-Francois; Wang, Shuaian
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Berth allocation and pilotage planning are the two most important decisions made by a seaport for serving incoming vessels. Traditionally, the berth allocation problem and the pilotage planning problem are solved sequentially, leading to suboptimal or even infeasible solutions for vessel services. This paper investigates a vessel service planning problem (VSPP) in seaports that addresses berth allocation and pilotage planning in combination. We introduce a compact mixed-integer linear programm...
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作者：Dal Sasso, Veronica; Lamorgese, Leonardo; Mannino, Carlo; Tancredi, Antonio; Ventura, Paolo
作者单位：SINTEF; University of Oslo; Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR)
摘要：A deadlock occurs when two or more trains are preventing each other from moving forward by occupying the required tracks. Deadlocks are rare but pernicious events in railroad operations and, in most cases, are caused by human errors. Recovering is a time-consuming and costly operation, producing large delays and often requiring crew rescheduling and complex switching moves. In practice, most deadlocks involve only two long trains missing their last potential meet location. In this paper, we pr...
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作者：Hunter, David Scott; Zaman, Tauhid
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：We consider the problem of optimizing the placement of stubborn agents in a social network in order to maximally influence the population. We assume the network contains stubborn users whose opinions do not change, and nonstubborn users who can be persuaded. We further assume that the opinions in the network are in an equilibrium that is common to many opinion dynamics models, including the well-known DeGroot model. We develop a discrete optimization formulation for the problem of maximally sh...
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作者：Pavone, Marco; Saberi, Amin; Schiffer, Maximilian; Tsao, Matt Wu
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Munich; Stanford University
摘要：We study an online hypergraph matching problem inspired by ridesharing and delivery applications. The vertices of a hypergraph are revealed sequentially and must be matched shortly thereafter, otherwise they will leave the system in favor of an outside option. Hyperedges are revealed to the algorithm once all of its vertices have arrived, and can only be included into the matching before any of its vertices leave the system. The cardinality of hyperedges are bounded by a small constant which r...
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作者：Balseiro, Santiago R.; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes; Zuo, Song
作者单位：Columbia University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We study the problem of designing dynamic double auctions for two-sided markets in which a platform intermediates the trade between one seller offering independent items to multiple buyers, repeatedly over a finite horizon, when agents have private values. Motivated by online platforms for advertising, ride-sharing, and freelancing markets, we seek to design mechanisms satisfying the following properties: no positive transfers, that is, the platform never asks the seller to make payments nor a...
