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作者：Dan, Zhuge; Wang, Shuaian; Zhen, Lu
作者单位：Shanghai University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Sulfur emission control areas (ECAs) are crucial for reducing global shipping emissions and protecting the environment. The main plank of an ECA policy is usually a fuel sulfur limit. However, the approaches to setting sulfur limits are relatively subjective and lack scientific support. This paper investigates the design of ECA policies, especially sulfur limits, for sailing legs with ECAs. The objective is to minimize the social costs of shipping operations, local sulfur oxides (SOx) emission...
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作者：Lyu, Chengyi; Zhang, Huanan; Xin, Linwei
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Chicago
摘要：In this paper, we consider a classic periodic -review lost -sales inventory system with lead times, which is notoriously challenging to optimize with a wide range of realworld applications. We consider a joint learning and optimization problem in which the decision maker does not know the demand distribution a priori and can only use past sales information (i.e., censored demand). Departing from existing learning algorithms on this learning problem that require the convexity property of the un...
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作者：Huettner, Frank; Boyaci, Tamer; Akcay, Yalcin
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); European School of Management & Technology; University of Melbourne
摘要：There is an error in one of the results of our paper [Huettner F, Boyaci T, Akcay Y (2019) Consumer choice under limited attention when alternatives have different information costs. Oper. Res. 67(3):671-699]. In this erratum, we point out the error and provide a correction based on Walker-Jones [(2023) Rational inattention with multiple attributes. J. Econom. Theory 212:105688]. Our key characterizations, insights, and numerical examples do not depend on this error and, hence, remain valid. T...
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作者：Kennedy, Adrian P.; Sethi, Suresh P.; Siu, Chi Chung; Yam, Sheung Chi Phillip
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Hang Seng University of Hong Kong
摘要：We propose a flexible yet tractable dynamic advertising model called the generalized Sethi model to capture different market penetration rates across various media and markets via advertising. Specifically, the generalized Sethi model employs a Cobb-Douglas production function of advertising expenditure and the untapped market share with constant returns to scale. It encompasses some standard dynamic advertising models as particular cases. Moreover, the model's flexibility does not compromise ...
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作者：Mamaghani, Fariba F.; Cakanyildirim, Metin
作者单位：Tulane University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Distributed solar power generation is growing but not necessarily benefiting the utility firms. Reducing the demand, it hinders the coverage of utility costs with reasonable retail electricity prices. Utilities raise prices, unintentionally reducing both demand and affordability of electricity, and are said to be caught in a utility (death) spiral. The reduced affordability adversely affects consumers who cannot invest in solar generation. Environmentally desirable solar power paradoxically ca...
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作者：Koulamas, Christos; Kyparisis, George; Pinedo, Michael; Wan, Guohua
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; New York University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Leung et al. (2010) [Leung JY-T, Pinedo M, Wan G (2010) Competitive two-agent scheduling and its applications. Oper. Res. 58:458-469] considered a two-agent nonpreemp-tive single-machine scheduling problem. Agent A is responsible for n1 jobs with due dates d1,...,dn and has as the objective the minimization of the total tardiness of the n1 jobs. Agent B is responsible for n2 jobs and has as the objective the minimization of the total completion time of the n2 jobs. The problem is to find a sch...
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作者：Romeijnders, Ward; Van Foreest, Nicky D.; Wijngaard, Jacob
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：When Dutch parents divorce, Dutch law dictates that the parental contributions to cover the financial needs of the children have to be proportionally consistent. This rule is clear when parents only have common children. However, cases can be considerably more complicated, for example, when parents have financial responsibilities to children from previous marriages. We show that, mathematically, this settlement problem can be modeled as a bipartite rationing problem for which a unique global p...
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作者：Chen, Zhi; Hu, Zhenyu; Wang, Ruiqin
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：Consider a seller seeking a selling mechanism to maximize the worst-case revenue obtained from a buyer whose valuation distribution lies in a certain ambiguity set. Such a mechanism design problem with one product and one buyer is known as the screening problem. For a generic convex ambiguity set, we show via the minimax theorem that strong duality holds between the problem of finding the optimal robust mechanism and a minimax pricing problem where the adversary first chooses a worst-case dist...
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作者：Papalexopoulos, Theodore; Alcorn, James; Bertsimas, Dimitris; Goff, Rebecca; Stewart, Darren; Trichakis, Nikolaos
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); United Network for Organ Sharing; New York University
摘要：The Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network (OPTN) initiated in 2018 a major overhaul of all U.S. deceased-donor organ allocation policies, aiming to gradually migrate them to a so-called continuous distribution model, with the goal of creating an allocation system that is more efficient, more equitable, and more inclusive. Development of policies within this model, however, represents a major challenge because multiple efficiency and fairness objectives need to be delicately balanced. We ...
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作者：Benade, Gerdus; Kazachkov, Aleksandr M.; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Psomas, Alexandros; Zeng, David
作者单位：Boston University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Harvard University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We study trade-offs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items online. We attempt to minimize envy, the extent to which any agent prefers another's allocation to their own, while being Pareto efficient. We provide matching lower and upper bounds against a sequence of progressively weaker adversaries. Against worst-case adversaries, we find a sharp trade-off; no allocation algorithm can simultaneously provide both nontrivial fairness and nontrivial efficiency guarantees. ...
