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作者:Keskin, N. Bora; Li, Meng
作者单位:Duke University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要:. In this paper, we study a firm's dynamic pricing problem in the presence of unknown and time-varying heterogeneity in customers' preferences for quality. The firm offers a standard product as well as a premium product to deal with this heterogeneity. First, we consider a benchmark case in which the transition structure of customer heteroge-neity is known. In this case, we analyze the firm's optimal pricing policy and characterize its key structural properties. Thereafter, we investigate the ...
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作者:Caldentey, Rene; Haugh, Martin B.
作者单位:University of Chicago; Imperial College London
摘要:We study Cournot competition among firms in a multimarket framework where each of the firms face different budget/capacity constraints. We assume independent linear inverse demand functions for each market and completely characterize the resulting unique equilibrium. Specifically, we introduce the notions of augmented and cutoff budgets for firms and markets, respectively. We show, for example, that firm i operates in market j if and only if firm i's augmented budget is greater than market j's...
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作者:Muharremoglu, Alp; Yang, Nan; Geng, Xin
作者单位:Amazon.com; University of Miami
摘要:We study a single -product assemble -to -order (ATO) system with exogenous lead times operated under a component base stock policy. Both demand and component lead times are random and are assumed to have finite supports. The challenge of evaluating a base stock policy in an ATO system with random lead times lies in the fact that one needs to compute the distribution of the minimum of n correlated random variables, where n is the number of components. The correlation arises because the replenis...
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作者:Keppo, Jussi; Touzi, Nizar; Zuo, Ruiting
作者单位:National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; New York University; New York University Tandon School of Engineering; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou)
摘要:We study incentive contracts in asset management business under dynamic actions and relationships between an investor, a partner of an investment company, and a fund manager of the company. Both the manager and the partner exert costly effort to manage the investments. The investor cannot perfectly observe the partner's and manager's actions, and similarly, the partner cannot perfectly observe the manager's actions. Thus, we consider a hierarchical contracting framework under hidden efforts, w...
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作者:Choi, Kyoung Jin; Koo, Hyeng Keun; Lim, Byung Hwa; Yoo, Jane
作者单位:University of Calgary; Ajou University; Pohang University of Science & Technology (POSTECH); Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要:We study a continuous-time model of consumption and portfolio selection of an agent with a limited ability to commit to a debt contract in which the credit limit is endogenously determined. We consider the case where the agent borrows against future income and/or collateral assets. We also study the determination of the credit limit in a general equilibrium model. We derive the credit limit in closed form. The credit limit is smaller than the natural limit because of limited commitment and an ...
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作者:Li, Hongmin; Webster, Scott
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:This paper is the first in the literature to address a risk-sensitive price competition under the multinomial logit choice model, with each participating firm maximizing a riskadjusted profit objective. We find that, at equilibrium, a subset of firms earns a positive profit, whereas others are driven to zero profit, contrasting with the risk-neutral equilibrium in which all firms earn a positive profit regardless of quality and cost. We identify a power index-the ratio of effective product att...
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作者:Fallah, Alireza; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; University of Toronto
摘要:We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesianoptimal mechanism design problem, in which an individual can share their (verifiable) data in exchange for a monetary reward or services, but at the same time has a (private) heterogeneous privacy cost which we quantify using differential privacy. We consider two popular differential privacy settings for providing privacy guar...
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作者:Ahani, Narges; Golz, Paul; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Teytelboym, Alexander; Trapp, Andrew C.
作者单位:Bank of America Corporation; Harvard University; University of Oxford; Worcester Polytechnic Institute; Worcester Polytechnic Institute
摘要:Employment outcomes of resettled refugees depend strongly on where they are initially placed in the host country. Each week, a resettlement agency is allocated a set of refugees by the U.S. government. The agency must place these refugees in its local affiliates while respecting the affiliates' annual capacities. We develop an allocation system that recommends where to place an incoming refugee family to improve total employment success. Our algorithm is based on two-stage stochastic programmi...
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作者:Bennett, Andrew; Kallus, Nathan
作者单位:Cornell University
摘要:In applications of offline reinforcement learning to observational data, such as in healthcare or education, a general concern is that observed actions might be affected by unobserved factors, inducing confounding and biasing estimates derived under the assumption of a perfect Markov decision process (MDP) model. Here we tackle this by considering off-policy evaluation in a partially observed MDP (POMDP). Specifically, we consider estimating the value of a given target policy in an unknown POM...
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作者:Freund, Daniel; Lykouris, Thodoris; Weng, Wentao
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We study decentralized multiagent learning in bipartite queueing systems, a standard model for service systems. In particular, N agents request service from K servers in a fully decentralized way, that is, by running the same algorithm without communication. Previous decentralized algorithms are restricted to symmetric systems, have performance that is degrading exponentially in the number of servers, require communication through shared randomness and unique agent identities, and are computat...