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作者:Wang, Hanzhao; Talluri, Kalyan; Li, Xiaocheng
作者单位:Imperial College London
摘要:We consider dynamic pricing with covariates under a generalized linear demand model: A seller can dynamically adjust the price of a product over a horizon of T time periods, and at each time period t, the demand of the product is jointly determined by the price and an observable covariate vector xt is an element of Rd through a generalized linear model with unknown coefficients. Most of the existing literature assumes the covariate vectors xts are independently and identically distributed (i.i...
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作者:Ozel, Aysu; Smilowitz, Karen; Goldstein, Lila K. S.
作者单位:Northwestern University
摘要:Comprehensive community engagement in public school district design is essential to create equitable and effective enrollment policies reflective of community needs and values. We revisit the school district design problem with a focus on codesigning with community partners. We introduce a new compact formulation that incorporates multiple decisions simultaneously by assigning students in each geographic unit to a set of schools (e.g., elementary, middle, and high schools, and schools with spe...
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作者:Chen, Xi; Simchi-Levi, David; Zhao, Zishuo; Zhou, Yuan
作者单位:New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要:In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both nonzero miner revenue and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for us...
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作者:Banerjee, Imon; Honnappa, Harsha; Rao, Vinayak
作者单位:Northwestern University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要:In this work, we study a natural nonparametric estimator of the transition probability matrices of a finite controlled Markov chain. We consider an off-line setting with a fixed data set of size m, collected using a so-called logging policy. We develop sample complexity bounds for the estimator and establish conditions for minimaxity. Our statistical bounds depend on the logging policy through its mixing properties. We show that achieving a particular statistical risk bound involves a subtle a...
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作者:Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Gravin, Nick; Schoepflin, Daniel
作者单位:Tel Aviv University; Drexel University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要:In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell some service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer i has a private value vi for receiving this service, but a feasibility constraint restricts which buyers can be simultaneously served. Recent work in economics introduced (deferred-acceptance) clock auctions as a superior class of auctions for this problem due to their transparency, simplicity, and strong incentive guarantees. Subsequent work focused on evaluati...