4期

最新文章

• Joint Order Fulfillment and Inventory Management in Assemble-to-Order Generalized W Systems AI翻译
  作者：Yu, Man; Zheng, Shaohui; Chen, Jiguang
  作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Xiamen University
  摘要：This paper characterizes joint order fulfillment and inventory policies for assemble-to-order generalized W systems, in which k products are assembled from a common component and k product-specific (dedicated) components. We consider a periodicreview system and focus on nested fulfillment policies, in which orders are fulfilled in decreasing order of profit margins. We prove that the optimal fulfillment policy of a twoproduct W system is nested. For systems with more than two products, althoug...
• A Simultaneous Column-and-Row Generation Solution Method for Liner Shipping Network Design AI翻译
  作者：Xia, Jun; Xu, Zhou; Baldacci, Roberto
  作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Qatar Foundation (QF); Hamad Bin Khalifa University-Qatar
  摘要：The liner shipping network design (LSND) problem involves creating regular ship rotations to transport containerized cargo between seaports. The objective is to maximize carrier profit by balancing revenue from satisfied demand against operating and transshipment costs. Finding an optimal solution is challenging because of complex rotation structures and joint decisions on fleet deployment, cargo routing, and rotation design. This work introduces a set partitioning-like formulation for LSND wi...
• Split Liver Transplantation: An Analytical Decision Support Model AI翻译
  作者：Tang, Yanhan (Savannah); Scheller-Wolf, Alan; Tayur, Sridhar; Perito, Emily R.; Roberts, John P.
  作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California San Francisco
  摘要：Split liver transplantation (SLT) is a procedure that potentially saves two lives using one liver, increasing the total benefit derived from the limited number of donated livers available. SLT may also improve equity by giving transplant candidates who are physically smaller (including children) increased access to liver transplants. However, SLT is rarely used in the United States. To help quantify the benefits of increased SLT utilization and provide decision support tools, we introduce a de...
• Hard and Soft Defense Against a Sequence of Aerial Threats AI翻译
  作者：Atkinson, Michael; Kress, Moshe
  作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; Naval Postgraduate School
  摘要：The increasing prevalence of missiles and drones (hereafter referred to as threats) in attacks by both state and nonstate actors highlights the critical need for a robust defense system to counter these threats. We develop a combat model for the engagement between a Blue defender who is subject to repeated attacks by Red threats. The defender employs two types of defenses: hard interceptors, such as antiballistic missiles, and soft measures, such as directedenergy weapons and jamming. Employin...
• Unit Commitment Without Commitment: A Dynamic Programming Approach for Managing an Integrated Energy System Under Uncertainty AI翻译
  作者：Brown, David B.; Smith, James E.
  作者单位：Duke University; Dartmouth College
  摘要：Though variability and uncertainty have always posed challenges for power systems, the increasing use of renewable energy sources has exacerbated these issues. At a vertically integrated utility, the system operator manages many generation units- renewable and otherwise-and storage units to ensure that the total energy produced matches contemporaneous demand. Current industry practice at these utilities involves solving unit commitment and economic dispatch optimization problems to choose prod...
• Off-line Estimation of Controlled Markov Chains: Minimaxity and Sample Complexity AI翻译
  作者：Banerjee, Imon; Honnappa, Harsha; Rao, Vinayak
  作者单位：Northwestern University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
  摘要：In this work, we study a natural nonparametric estimator of the transition probability matrices of a finite controlled Markov chain. We consider an off-line setting with a fixed data set of size m, collected using a so-called logging policy. We develop sample complexity bounds for the estimator and establish conditions for minimaxity. Our statistical bounds depend on the logging policy through its mixing properties. We show that achieving a particular statistical risk bound involves a subtle a...
• Partition and Prosper: Design and Pricing of Single Bundle AI翻译
  作者：Sun, Hailong; Li, Xiaobo; Teo, Chung-Piaw
  作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
  摘要：Product bundling is a widely used selling strategy among multiproduct firms, yet designing and pricing bundles optimally remain a complex challenge. This paper addresses this fundamental issue by exploring the selection and pricing of a single bundle from a range of products. For instance, in the single bundle with the rest (SBR) framework, the bundle is optimally chosen and priced, whereas the remaining products are offered individually, collectively maximizing profit. We show that the SBR op...
• Convex Chance-Constrained Programs with Wasserstein Ambiguity AI翻译
  作者：Shen, Haoming; Jiang, Ruiwei
  作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
  摘要：Chance constraints yield nonconvex feasible regions in general. In particular, when the uncertain parameters are modeled by a Wasserstein ball, existing studies showed that the distributionally robust (pessimistic) chance constraint admits a mixed-integer conic representation. This paper identifies sufficient conditions that lead to convex feasible regions of chance constraints with Wasserstein ambiguity. First, when uncertainty arises from the right-hand side of a pessimistic joint chance con...
• Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions AI翻译
  作者：Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Gravin, Nick; Schoepflin, Daniel
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Drexel University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
  摘要：In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell some service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer i has a private value vi for receiving this service, but a feasibility constraint restricts which buyers can be simultaneously served. Recent work in economics introduced (deferred-acceptance) clock auctions as a superior class of auctions for this problem due to their transparency, simplicity, and strong incentive guarantees. Subsequent work focused on evaluati...
• Crosscutting Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation AI翻译
  作者：Chen, Xi; Simchi-Levi, David; Zhao, Zishuo; Zhou, Yuan
  作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
  摘要：In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both nonzero miner revenue and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for us...