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作者:Heese, H. Sebastian; Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda
作者单位:European Business School (EBS) University; North Carolina State University
摘要:We consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retailer and learn about the actual sales revenues, we show that the supplier will never find it optimal to...
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作者:Pourakbar, M.; van der Laan, E.; Dekker, R.
作者单位:Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要:We consider the service parts end-of-life inventory problem of a capital goods manufacturer in the final phase of its life cycle. The final phase starts as soon as the production of parts terminates and continues until the last service contract expires. Final order quantities are considered a popular tactic to sustain service fulfillment obligations and to mitigate the effect of obsolescence. In addition to the final order quantity, other sources to obtain serviceable parts are repairing retur...
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作者:Chen, Rachel R.; Robinson, Lawrence W.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Davis; Cornell University
摘要:This paper studies appointment scheduling for a combination of routine patients who book well in advance and last-minute patients who call for an appointment later that same day. We determine when these same-day patients should be scheduled throughout the day, and how the prospect of their arrivals affects the appointment times of the routine patients. By formulating the problem as a stochastic linear program, we are able to incorporate random and heterogeneous service times and no-show rates,...
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作者:Bhattacharya, Shantanu; Hasija, Sameer; Van Wassenhove, Luk N.
作者单位:INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School
摘要:We analyze the efficacy of different asset transfer mechanisms and provide policy recommendations for the design of humanitarian supply chains. As a part of their preparedness effort, humanitarian organizations often make decisions on resource investments ex ante because doing so allows for rapid response if an adverse event occurs. However, programs typically operate under funding constraints and donor earmarks with autonomous decision-making authority resting with the local entities, which m...
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作者:Chen, Wei; Dawande, Milind; Janakiraman, Ganesh
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:We study several finite-horizon, discrete-time, dynamic, stochastic inventory control models with integer demands: the newsvendor model, its multi-period extension, and a single-product, multi-echelon assembly model. Equivalent linear programs are formulated for the corresponding stochastic dynamic programs, and integrality results are derived based on the total unimodularity of the constraint matrices. Specifically, for all these models, starting with integer inventory levels, we show that th...
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作者:Kunnumkal, Sumit
作者单位:Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要:In this study, we present new approximation methods for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior. Our methods are sampling-based and so can handle fairly general customer choice models. The starting point for our methods is a dynamic program that allows randomization. An attractive feature of this dynamic program is that the size of its action space is linear in the number of itineraries, as opposed to exponential. It turns out that this dynamic program has a struct...
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作者:Biyalogorsky, Eyal; Koenigsberg, Oded
作者单位:Reichman University; University of London; London Business School
摘要:This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels ...
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作者:Sodhi, ManMohan S.; Tang, Christopher S.
作者单位:City St Georges, University of London; Indian School of Business (ISB); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:Many social enterprises and some companies have developed supply chains with the poor as suppliers or distributors to alleviate poverty and to create revenues for themselves. Such supply chains have created new research opportunities because they raise issues fundamentally different from those examined in the existing operations management literature. We report this phenomenon of supply chains with the poor as suppliers or distributors in developing countries and identify operations management...
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作者:Chen, Lucy Gongtao; Ding, Ding; Ou, Jihong
作者单位:National University of Singapore; University of International Business & Economics
摘要:This paper studies the impact of supply chain power structure on firms' profitability in an assembly system with one assembler and two suppliers. Two power regimes are investigated-in a Single Power Regime, a more powerful firm acts as the Stackelberg leader to decide the wholesale price but not the quantity whereas in a Dual Power Regime, both the price and quantity decisions are granted to the more powerful firm. Tallying the power positions of the three firms, for each power regime we study...
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作者:Meca, Ana; Sosic, Greys
作者单位:Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche; University of Southern California
摘要:Motivated by supply chain collaborations in practice, we introduce a class of cost-coalitional problems, which are based on a priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and receiving when there exist players whose participation in an alliance always contributes to the savings of all alliance members (we refer to these ...