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作者：Fleischhacker, Adam; Anh Ninh; Zhao, Yao
作者单位：University of Delaware; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：As a result of slow patient recruitment and high patient costs in the United States, clinical trials are increasingly going global. While recruitment efforts benefit from a larger global footprint, the supply chain has to work harder at getting the right drug supply to the right place at the right time. Certain clinical trial supply chains, especially those supplying biologics, have a combination of unique attributes that have yet to be addressed by existing supply chain models. These attribut...
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作者：Geng, Xin; Huh, Woonghee Tim; Nagarajan, Mahesh
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We look at a simple service system with two servers serving arriving jobs (single class). Our interest is in examining the effect of routing policies on servers when they care about fairness among themselves, and when they can endogenously choose capacities in response to the routing policy. Therefore, we study the two-server game where the servers' objective functions have a term explicitly modeling fairness. Moreover, we focus on four commonly seen policies that are from one general class. T...
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作者：Rui, Huaxia; Lai, Guoming
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the deferred payment and inspection mechanisms for mitigating supplier product adulteration, with endogenous procurement decision and general defect discovery process. We first derive the optimal deferred payment contract, which reveals that either entire or partial deferral can arise, depending on the moral hazard severity and the information accumulation rate. Because of the supplier's incentive to adulterate, the optimal procurement quantity under deferred payment generally is smal...
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作者：Mak, Vincent; Gisches, Eyran J.; Rapoport, Amnon
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Arizona; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We report the results of an experimental study of route choice in congestible networks with a common origin and common destination. In one condition, in each round of play network users independently committed themselves at the origin to a three-segment route; in the other condition, they chose route segments sequentially at each network junction upon receiving en route information. At the end of each round, players received ex-post complete information about the distribution of the route choi...
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作者：Abrahams, Alan S.; Fan, Weiguo; Wang, G. Alan; Zhang, Zhongju (John); Jiao, Jian
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Connecticut; Microsoft
摘要：The recent surge in the usage of social media has created an enormous amount of user-generated content (UGC). While there are streams of research that seek to mine UGC, these research studies seldom tackle analysis of this textual content from a quality management perspective. In this study, we synthesize existing research studies on text mining and propose an integrated text analytic framework for product defect discovery. The framework effectively leverages rich social media content and quan...
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作者：Penmetsa, Nabita; Gal-Or, Esther; May, Jerrold
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We analyze the dynamic price discrimination strategies of a monopolist who offers new services on a subscription basis. Access to customers' subscription histories permits the monopolist to design pricing policies that can be based on customers' past purchase behavior, and on the time period in which they made their purchases. Uncertainty regarding the value of new features, and heterogeneity in consumers' valuation for existing features, creates inter-temporal incentives that influence both p...
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作者：Yan, Xinghao; Zhao, Hui; Tang, Kwei
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Chengchi University
摘要：Quality contracting is critical and challenging due to the many unique issues related to quality. In this study, we analyze the first-mover right in quality contracting by considering two different strategies for the buyer: the quality requirement strategy (QR) where buyer moves first by posting quality requirement to suppliers and quality promise strategy (QP) where buyer voluntarily gives up the first-mover right to suppliers to ask them to promise quality. We study which strategy (1) better...
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作者：Bichler, Martin; Guler, Kemal; Mayer, Stefan
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Hewlett-Packard
摘要：We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions. We focus on two sealed-bid split-award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi-object extensions of the first-price sealed-bid auction. We derive the risk-neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the...
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作者：Riezebos, Jan; Zhu, Stuart X.
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：This study examines a deterministic material requirements planning (MRP) problem where lead times at subsequent ordering moments differ. Adequate replenishment methods that can cope with lead time differences are lacking because of the order crossover phenomenon, that is, replenishment orders are not received in the sequence they are ordered. This study specifies how to handle order crossovers and recalculate planned order releases after an update of gross requirements. The optimal (s, S) poli...
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作者：Li, Tao; Sethi, Suresh P.; He, Xiuli
作者单位：Santa Clara University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Charlotte
摘要：We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer's second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two-period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium...
