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作者：Ng, Desmond; Westgren, Randall; Sonka, Steven
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Unlike institutional or macro-cultural explanations of competition, competition need not be viewed as a shared social reality. Instead, competition can be interpreted differently by multiple stakeholders of a value chain. However, clue to managerial blind spots, such various interpretations of competition are less than apparent to management. Yet e,,explanations of such blind spots are not well documented. Hence, to explain such blind spots, a conceptual model based oil overconfidence biases i...
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作者：Kalyta, Paul
作者单位：University of Ottawa
摘要：Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation Contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because lop managers with power oiler boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over bo...
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作者：Fitza, Markus; Matusik, Sharon F.; Mosakowski, Elaine
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Connecticut
摘要：Adding to the corporate effect literature, we study the effect of owners on firm performance in a new context, that of venture capital firms (VCs) and the start-up firms in which they invest. After discussing the effect that VC ownership call have oil start-ups, we estimate that start-up-specific, discussing the of ownership can have on start-up-specific, owner (VC), and year effects account for significant variance in performance (26.3 percent, 11.2 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively). The...
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作者：Bosse, Douglas A.; Phillips, Robert A.; Harrison, Jeffrey S.
作者单位：University of Richmond
摘要：The assumption that economic actors behave in a boundedly self-interested manner promises fruitful new insights for strategic management. A growing literature spanning multiple disciplines indicates most actors' selfish utility maximizing behaviors are bounded by norms of fairness. Rather than being purely self-interested, people behave reciprocally by rewarding others whose actions they deem fair and willingly incurring costs to punish those they deem unfair. Economists Show that employers wh...
