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作者:Foss, Nicolai J.; Frederiksen, Lars; Rullani, Francesco
作者单位:Copenhagen Business School; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Aarhus University; Luiss Guido Carli University; Copenhagen Business School
摘要:Research summary: Building on the problem-solving perspective, we study behaviors related to projects and the communication-based antecedents of such behaviors in the free open-source software (FOSS) community. We examine two kinds of problem/project-behaviors: Individuals can set up projects around the formulation of new problems or join existing projects and define and/or work on subproblems within an existing problem. The choice between these two behaviors is influenced by the mode of commu...
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作者:Martignoni, Dirk; Menon, Anoop; Siggelkow, Nicolaj
作者单位:Universita della Svizzera Italiana; University of Pennsylvania
摘要:Research summary:Mental models, reflecting interdependencies among managerial choice variables, are not always correctly specified. Mental models can be underspecified, missing interdependencies, or overspecified, containing nonexistent interdependencies. Using a simulation model, we find that under- and overspecification have opposite effects on exploration, and thereby, performance. The effects are also opposite, depending on whether a manager controls all choice variables. The mechanism und...
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作者:Belenzon, Sharon; Patacconi, Andrea; Zarutskie, Rebecca
作者单位:Duke University; University of East Anglia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要:Research summary: Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family-owned firms have higher profit...
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作者:Cho, Sam Y.; Arthurs, Jonathan D.; Townsend, David M.; Miller, Douglas R.; Barden, Jeffrey Q.
作者单位:Oregon State University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要:Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be e...
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作者:Reuer, Jeffrey J.; Arino, Africa; Poppo, Laura; Zenger, Todd
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Kansas; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
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作者:Shipilov, Andrew; Stern, Ithai
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作者:Zhu, David H.; Shen, Wei
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post-succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide supp...
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作者:Adegbesan, Adetunji; Mitchell, Will; Wahler, Benedikt
作者单位:University of Toronto
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作者:Leiponen, Aija; Mitchell, Will
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作者:Stuart, Toby; Wang, Yanbo
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:Research summary: We document the extent of fraudulent reporting among 467 private Chinese technology companies. Comparing the financial statements concurrently submitted to two different state agencies, we demonstrate a systematic gap in reported profit figures in the two sets of books. We find: (1) more than half the sampled companies report incentive-compatible, materially discrepant profit numbers to the two agencies; (2) politically connected companies are approximately 18 percent more li...