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作者:Christensen, Michael; Dahl, Christian M.; Knudsen, Thorbjorn; Warglien, Massimo
作者单位:University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern Denmark; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要:This paper addresses a notable gap at the intersection of organizational economics and organization science: how does organizational context influence aggregation of individual behavior in organizational decisions? Using basic centralized versus decentralized organizational structures as building blocks for our experimental design, we examine whether assignment of organizational positions, incentive schemes, and structural configuration induce endogenous adaptation in the form of change in res...
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作者:Hamman, John R.; Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要:We study how organizations use team selection and delegation of authority jointly to navigate uncertain environments. To do so, we model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of the workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. Delegation enables better-informed workers to allocate tasks more efficiently when uncertainty is high relative to the incentive conflict between manager and worker. Our novel a...
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作者:Radoynovska, Nevena; Ruttan, Rachel
作者单位:emlyon business school; University of Toronto
摘要:Category-spanning organizations have been shown to face a number of penalties compared with organizations occupying a single category. The assumption seems to be, however, that organizations spanning the same categories will be evaluated similarly. Yet, this is not always the case. We know far less about why evaluations may differ within category-spanners, largely due to existing studies' focus on comparing single-category to category-spanning organizations in equilibrium states at a fixed poi...
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作者:Hergueux, Jerome; Henry, Emeric; Benkler, Yochai; Algan, Yann
作者单位:Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Harvard University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Harvard University
摘要:Organizations are riddled with cooperation problems, that is, instances in which workers need to voluntarily exert effort to achieve efficient collective outcomes. To sustain high levels of cooperation, the experimental literature demonstrates the centrality of reciprocal preferences but has also overlooked some of its negative consequences. In this paper, we ran lab-in-the-field experiments in the context of open-source software development teams to provide the first field evidence that highl...