作者：Gennaioli, Nicola; Martin, Alberto; Rossi, Stefano
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold...
作者：Diamond, Douglas W.; He, Zhiguo
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; l...
