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作者：Leitner, Yaron; Williams, Basil
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Should regulators reveal the models they use to stress-test banks? In our setting, revealing leads to gaming, but secrecy can induce banks to underinvest in socially desirable assets for fear of failing the test. We show that although the regulator can solve this underinvestment problem by making the test easier, some disclosure may still be optimal (e.g., if banks have high appetite for risk or if capital shortfalls are not very costly). Cutoff rules are optimal within monotone disclosure rul...
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作者：Griffin, John M.; Hirschey, Nicholas; Kruger, Samuel
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Municipal bonds exhibit considerable retail pricing variation, even for same-size trades of the same bond on the same day, and even from the same dealer. Markups vary widely across dealers. Trading strongly clusters on eighth price increments, and clustered trades exhibit higher markups. Yields are often lowered to just above salient numbers. Machine learning estimates exploiting the richness of the data show that dealers that use strategic pricing have systematically higher markups. Recent Mu...
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作者：Chernov, Mikhail; Dahlquist, Magnus; Lochstoer, Lars
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：The currency market features a small cross-section, and conditional expected returns can be characterized by few signals: interest differential, trend, and mean reversion. We exploit these properties to construct the ex ante mean-variance efficient portfolio of individual currencies. The portfolio is updated in real time and prices all prominent currency trading strategies, conditionally and unconditionally. The fraction of risk in these assets that does not affect their risk premiums is at le...
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作者：Li, Jiasun
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative ...
