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作者：Graham, JR; Harvey, CR
作者单位：Duke University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze the advice contained in a sample of 237 investment newsletter strategies over 1980-1992. Each newsletter strategy recommends a mix of equity and cash. We find no evidence that letters systematically increase equity weights before market rises or decrease weights before market declines. While there is no information in the newsletter strategies about future market returns, we document that disagreement among the newsletters is correlated with future realized and implied volatility.
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作者：Graham, JR
摘要：This paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate, which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital, financing policy, corporate hedging, and corporate reorganizations. The results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996), although difficult to calculate, is the best available proxy for the 'true' marginal tax rate. If the simulated rate is unavailable, an easy-to-calculate trichotomous variable or the statu...
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作者：Graham, JR
摘要：Do taxes affect corporate debt policy? This paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses, investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code, tax regime shifts, business cycle effects, and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule. Using annual data from more than 10,000 f...
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作者：Yermack, D
摘要：I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective. Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. The result is robust to numerous controls for company size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance structures. Companies with small boards a...
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作者：Franks, J; Mayer, C
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper examines the disciplining function of hostile takeovers in the U.K. in 1985 and 1986. We report evidence of high board turnover and significant levels of post-takeover restructuring. Large gains are anticipated in hostile bids as reflected in high bid premiums. However, there is little evidence of poor performance prior to bids, suggesting that the high board turnover does not derive from past managerial failure. Hostile takeovers do not therefore perform a disciplining function. In...
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作者：Jensen, MC; Long, JB; Mikkelson, WH; Ruback, RS; Schwert, GW; Smith, CW; Warner, JB
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作者：Sundaram, AK; John, TA; John, K
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We operalionalize a firm's competitive strategy through a new empirical measure, and develop a framework for empirical analysis of the market value of strategic behavior. Using this framework, we study announcement effects of R&D spending. The announcing firm's stock prices are positively influenced by a change in spending, and negatively by our competitive strategy measure (CSM). Competitors' stock prices are positively influenced by the interaction between the market's reaction to the announ...
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作者：Jensen, MC; Long, JB; Mikkelson, WH; Ruback, RS; Schwert, GW; Smith, CW; Warner, JB
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Oregon
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作者：Jensen, MC; Schwert, GW
作者单位：University of Rochester
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作者：Jung, KY; Kim, YC; Stulz, RM
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Texas Christian University; Clemson University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper investigates the ability of the pecking-order model, the agency model, and the timing model to explain arms' decisions whether to issue debt or equity, the stock price reaction to their decisions, and their actions afterward. We find strong support for the agency model. Firms often depart from the pecking order because of agency considerations. We fail to find support for the timing model.
