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作者：Denis, DJ; Mihov, VT
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Texas Christian University
摘要：Using a sample of 1,560 new debt financings, we examine the choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. The primary determinant of the debt source is the credit quality of the issuer. Firms with the highest credit quality borrow from public sources, firms with medium credit quality borrow from banks, and firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from non-bank private lenders. Non-bank private debt thus plays a unique role in accommodating the financing needs of firms with...
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作者：Amihud, Y; Hauser, S; Kirsh, A
作者单位：New York University; Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We examine theories of IPO underpricing using unique data from Israel where the allocation to subscribers is by equal proration. This enables us to simulate the return earned by uninformed investors. Consistent with Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection, allocations were negatively related to underpricing. But uninformed investors earned a negative allocalion-weighted initial return, although the average initial return was 12%. They could break even, however, by using publicly available in...
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作者：Stulz, RM; Williamson, R
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's nat...
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作者：Bates, TW; Lemmon, ML
作者单位：University of Delaware; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We examine the provision of termination fee clauses in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. Target-payable fees are observed more frequently when bidding is costly and the potential for information expropriation by third parties is significant. Fee provisions appear to benefit target shareholders through higher deal completion rates and greater negotiated takeover premiums. We conclude that target-payable fees serve as an efficient contracting device, rather than a means by which to deter ...
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作者：Sun, Q; Tong, WHS
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We evaluate the performance changes of 634 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on China's two exchanges upon share issuing privatisation (SIP) in the period 1994-1998. We find that SIP is effective in improving SOEs' earnings ability, real sales, and workers' productivity but is not successful in improving profit returns and leverage after privatisation. We also find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm perform...
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作者：Andricopoulos, AD; Widdicks, M; Duck, PW; Newton, DP
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Manchester
摘要：This paper proposes and develops a novel, simple, widely applicable numerical approach for option pricing based on quadrature methods. Though in some ways similar to lattice or finite-difference schemes, it possesses exceptional accuracy and speed. Discretely monitored options are valued with only one timestep between observations, and nodes can be perfectly placed in relation to discontinuities. Convergence is improved greatly; in the extrapolated scheme, a doubling of points can reduce error...
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作者：Frank, MZ; Goyal, VK
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining ne...
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作者：Ali, A; Hwang, LS; Trombley, MA
作者单位：University of Arizona; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：This paper shows that the book-to-market (B/M) effect is greater for stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatility, higher transaction costs, and lower investor sophistication, consistent with the market-mispricing explanation for the anomaly. The B/M effect for high volatility stocks exceeds that for the low volatility stocks in 20 of the 22 sample years. Also, volatility exhibits significant incremental power beyond transaction costs and investor sophistication measures in explaining cr...
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作者：Beck, T; Demirgüç-Kunt, A; Levine, R
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; The World Bank; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using a sample of 70 former colonies, this paper assesses two theories regarding the historical determinants of financial development. The law and finance theory holds that legal traditions, brought by colonizers, differ in terms of protecting the rights of private investors vis-A-vis the state, with important implications for financial markets. The endowment theory argues that the disease environment encountered by colonizers influences the formation of long-lasting institutions that shape fi...
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作者：Harford, J
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：I investigate the nature of the incentives that lead outside directors to serve stockholders' interests. Specifically, I document the effect of a takeover bid on target directors, both in terms of its immediate financial impact and its effect on the number of future board seats held by those target directors. Directors are rarely retained following a completed offer. All target directors hold fewer directorships in the future than a control group, suggesting that the target board seat is diffi...
