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作者：Bebchuk, LA; Cohen, A
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or it proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with ail economically meaningfull reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring abo...
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作者：Acharya, VV; Pedersen, LH
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security's required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security's liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the v...
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作者：Nagel, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Short-sale constraints are most likely to bind among stocks with low institutional ownership. Because of institutional constraints, most professional investors simply never sell short and hence cannot trade against overpricing of stocks they do not own. Furthermore, stock loan supply tends to be sparse and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Using institutional ownership as a proxy, I find that short-sale constraints help explain cross-sectional stock return anoma...
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作者：Dinç, IS
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's...
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作者：Loughran, T; Schultz, P
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Our paper examines the impact of geographic location on liquidity for U.S. rural- and Urban-based companies. Even after adjusting for size and other Factors, rural firms trade much less, are covered by fewer analysts, and are owned by fewer institutions than urban firms. Trading costs are higher for rural Nasdaq firms, and volume that can be attributed to marketwide factors is lower for rural stocks. The findings add to our understanding of the way that access to information and familiarity af...
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作者：Battalio, RH; Mendenhall, RR
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：We provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets. Investors initiating large trades respond to analysts' earnings forecast errors, while investors initiating small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels. This suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that Bernard and Thomas [Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305-340] theorize ca...
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作者：Goldman, E; Qian, J
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston College
摘要：We offer an explanation for why raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target firm's value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally acquire a small toehold even if the acquisition does not drive up the pre-tender target price. This occurs because although a larger toehold increases profits if the takeover Succeeds it also conveys a higher level of managerial entrenchment and hence...
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作者：Jorion, P; Liu, Z; Shi, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Regulation Fair Disclosure, implemented on October 23, 2000, prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, nonpublic disclosures to favored investment professionals. Regulation Fair Disclosure has a number of exclusions, however, including disclosure of nonpublic information to credit rating agencies. As a result, credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential information that is no longer made available to equity analysts, potentially increasing the information conten...
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作者：Locke, PR; Mann, SC
作者单位：Texas Christian University; George Washington University
摘要：Recent evidence indicates irrational behavior among retail investors. They hold onto losses and sell winners in a manner consistent with the disposition effect. Market professionals often use the term discipline to indicate trading strategies that minimize potential behavioral influences. We investigate the nature of trading discipline and whether professional traders are able to avoid the costly irrational behaviors found in retail populations. The full-time traders in our sample hold onto lo...
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作者：Siegel, J
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The study tests the functional convergence hypothesis, which states that foreign firms can leapfrog their countries' weak legal institutions by listing equities in New York and agreeing to follow U.S. securities law. Evidence shows that the SEC and minority shareholders have not effectively enforced the law against cross-listed foreign firms. Detailed evidence from Mexico further shows that while some insiders exploited this weak legal enforcement with impunity, others that issued a cross-list...
