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作者：Cheng, C. S. Agnes; Huang, Henry He; Li, Yinghua; Lobo, Gerald
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Texas A&M University System; Prairie View A&M University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper investigates the effectiveness Of using securities class action lawsuits in monitoring defendant firms by institutional lead plaintiffs from two aspects: (1) immediate litigation outcomes, including the probability of surviving the motion to dismiss and the settlement amount, and (2) subsequent governance improvement such as changes in board independence. Using a large sample of securities lawsuits from 1996 to 2005, we show that institutional investors are more likely to serve as t...
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作者：Duchin, Ran; Ozbas, Oguzhan; Sensoy, Berk A.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, a...
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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Johnson, Timothy C.
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London Business School; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, a greater number of insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation features detection and punishment policies that become stricter as the number of insiders increases, reducing insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts during the period 2000-2006 and relate these to the number of financing partic...
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作者：Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade loans, or they hold cash. They also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be volatile when market prices of loans are volatile, but it also points t...
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作者：Gul, Ferdinand A.; Kim, Jeong-Bon; Qiu, Annie A.
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996-2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder...
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作者：Benson, David; Ziedonis, Rosemarie H.
作者单位：University of Oregon; Brigham Young University
摘要：A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are good acqu...
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作者：Broughman, Brian; Fried, Jesse
作者单位：Harvard University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Incomplete contracting theory suggests that venture capitalist (VC) cash flow rights, including liquidation preferences, could be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected data set of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations from VCs' cash flow rights tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's ...
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作者：Massa, Massimo; Reuter, Jonathan; Zitzewitz, Eric
作者单位：Boston College; Dartmouth College
摘要：We study the choice between named and anonymous Mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset ...
