When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Massa, Massimo; Reuter, Jonathan; Zitzewitz, Eric
• 署名单位: Boston College; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 400-424
• 关键词: mutual funds; Named managers; Marketing; media; favoritism

摘要

We study the choice between named and anonymous Mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.